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SLAVERY AS KNOWN TO EARLY BUDDHISTS

By B. C. Law

Slavery is a very old institution. It existed, even in its worst form, in Egypt, Sumeria, Chaldea, Babylonia, Assyria, Phoenicia, Greece and Rome, China and Persia. It existed in different forms and degrees when Megasthenes visited India as Greek ambassador. A regular trade in slaves was carried on in all these countries. It is rightly observed that slavery and idolatry of various kinds and forms darkened the social and religious life of the ancient peoples, and that they were the two dreaded evils against which the human soul cried for relief, release, and emancipation.

If Megasthenes had paid the highest compliment to India on the ground that no person was held as a slave and all were treated as free, even the foreigners not being used as slaves, it was, as Rhys Davids sought to explain, for the reason that the kind and form of slavery which existed then in India was nothing when compared with the Greek or the Roman form.[1] But the better explanation seems to be that the Greek ambassador distinguished simply between *de jure* and *de facto* slaves. In India of his time all men were held equal and all Indians passed as free citizens in the eye of law. He did not omit to mention

[1] *Buddhist India*, p. 55.

that both the philosophic view and the law of the land combined to see all men free in India, allowing property to be unevenly distributed[2]

In corroboration of the above testimony of Megasthenes we may cite the bold pronouncement in the Kauṭilīya *Arthaśāstra*, that servitude shall not be the condition of an Aryan, although it may be proper for the *Mlecchas* to sell or hold children to slavery[3]. Accordingly it prescribes the following laws to safeguard the position of slaves and to merit the admiration of all right-thinking men.

Employing a slave to carry the dead or to sweep urine or the leavings of food, etc., keeping a slave naked or hurting or abusing him or violating the chastity of a female slave shall cause the forfeiture of the value paid for him or her. When a man commits or helps another to commit rape with a female slave he shall not only forfeit the purchase value but also pay a certain amount of money to her and a fine of twice the amount to the government. The ransom necessary for a slave to regain his freedom is equal to what he has been sold for. Failure to set a slave at liberty on the receipt of a required amount of ransom shall be punished. If a pregnant female slave is sold or pledged without any provision for her confinement, her master shall be punished, as well as the abettor. Selling or mortgaging the life of a slave once liberated shall be punished with fine.

The statement in the *Arthaśāstra* regarding the slave-trade among the Mlecchas has its strong support in an incidental statement of the Buddha, purporting to say that the Yonas, Kambojas, Gandhāras, and other peoples of the Frontier countries admitted just two social grades of mas-

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[2] McCrindle, *Ancient India*, pp. 38 and 211.

[3] *Arthaśāstra* (Revised and edited by R. Shāma Sāstrī), 1919, p. 181 : *Mlecchānāmadoṣāḥ prajaṁ vikretumādhātuṁ vā. Na tvevāryasya dāsabhāvaḥ.*

ters and slaves (*ayya*, *dāsa*) without meaning an impassable social barrier between the two:

ayyo hutvā dāso hoti, dāso hutvā ayyo hoti.[4]

They are typically the peoples of the *Uttarāpatha* or North-Western India who are described in the *Mahābhārata*. XII, 207, 43 as terrible Mleccha tribes :—

Uttarāpatha-janmānaḥ kīrtayiṣyāmi tān api.
Yauna-Kāmboja-Gāndhārāḥ Kirātā-Barbaraiḥ saha. (43)

They are again the peoples whom the Pali scholiast Buddhaghoṣa characterises as Persianised in their social organization (*Pārasaka-vaṇṇā* or Pārisaka-vaṇṇā)[5].

The Vidhurapaṇḍita Jātaka speaks of the four kinds of slaves :

(1) those born of slave parents or begotten on slave women (*antojātā*),[6] (2) those purchased with money (*dhanakkītā*), (3) those reduced to slavery under coercion by bandits (*karamarānītā*) and (4) those who took slavery of their own accord (*sāmaṁdāsabyamupagatā*).

Slavery might be incurred through capture[7] or commuted death sentence or debt[8] or voluntary self-degradation[9] or judicial punishment[10].

The *Manusaṁhitā* (viii. 415) distinguishes seven kinds of slaves: (1) those who are captured during the war, (2) those who serve in return for maintenance, (3) those who are born in the house, (4) those who are bought, (5) those who are received as gifts, (6) those who are inherited from the father, and (7) those who are made slaves by court sentence.

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[4] *Majjhima Nikāya*, ii, p. 149.
[5] *Papañca-sūdanī*, III, p. 410.
[6] *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, i, p. 300.
[7] *Jāt.* IV, 220 ; V, 497.
[8] *Ibid*, VI, 521.
[9] *Vinaya*, I, 72 ; *Sumaṅgala*, I, 168.
[10] *Jātaka*, I, 200.

The *Arthaśāstra* list is made up of at least ten kinds of slaves, while Nārada's law book recognizes a still larger number. Thus the number of classes increased in time, and slavery assumed a feudal character since, perhaps, it received a legal sanction from the Brahmin law givers headed by Manu.[11]

There is a mention of six kinds of slaves in the Jain literature also. They are as follows: (1) slaves from very birth (*gabbha*); (2) those who were bought (*kīya*); (3) those who were unable to pay their debts (*aṇaya*); (4) those who were made slaves during famine (*dubbhikkha*); (5) those who could not pay fine (*sāvarāha*); and (6) those who were taken prisoners (*ruddha*)-vide *Piṇḍa Niryukti*, 319; *Mahānisīha Sūya*, p. 28; J. C. Jain, *Life in Ancient India as depicted in the Jain Canons*, p. 107.

The individuals, captured in predatory raids were reduced to slavery[12]. They became slaves of their own accord[13]. Children born to slaves were also slaves. In the majority of cases we find that the slaves were employed as household servants. They were also employed to cultivate lands. In the house of a pious Brāhmaṇa named Dhammapāla even the slaves and labourers gave alms and observed the precepts and fasts[14]. The slaves were regarded as the property of the master[15]. The Sonananda Jātaka [16] speaks of manumitted slaves.

The Jātakas contain instances where the slaves were bought for 700 kahāpaṇas[17]. Traffic in human beings (*satta-*

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[11] Manu, VIII, 418; *Śūdraṁ tu kārayed dāsyaṁ kṛtaṁ akṛtam eva vā |dāsyāyaiva hi sṛṣṭo 'sau Brāhmaṇasya Svayambhuvā*

[12] *Jātaka*, iv, 220.

[13] *Vinaya Texts*, i, 191.

[14] *Jāt.* iv, 50.

[15] *Visayha* Jātaka, *Jātaka*, iii, 129.

[16] *Jātaka*, No. 532.

[17] *Jātaka*, iii, 343.

vanijjā, *manussavikkaya*)[18] implied slave trade. According to the Milinda, rooms in a well-laid city or town had to be made for the residence of the various classes of people, including slaves and slave-girls[19].

The Pali work *Apadāna* refers to household servants (*pessikā*)[20]. The slaves (*Dāsa-kammakaras*) laboured for others in return of some payment (*bhataka*), whether in kind or in money[21]. The profession of a slave was hereditary. The agriculture labourers received the customary wages. The day labourers returned to their own houses in the evening.[22] The slave or servant was an adjunct in all households, capable of rendering domestic service. The male and female slaves were domestic servants who resided in the houses of their masters and performed all household duties.[23] Children born of slave parents generally took to the same profession[24]. There was a home-born slave by the name of Bīraṇī[25]. The captives or prisoners of war could be enslaved. A beautiful maiden, whenever caught as a prisoner of war, was used as a slave[26] (*dāsībhogena bhuñjissanti*). Slaves, specially female, were given away as gifts (*dānaṁ*)[27]. A village superintendent was made a slave of the village because he slandered the villagers, before the king[28]. Ministers condemned to death by the king for jealousy were given away as slaves[29] (*dāse katvā adāsi*). Attendants and menials belonged

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[18] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, iii, 208.

[19] *Milinda*, p. 331.

[20] *Apadāna*, II, 357 foll.

[21] *Jātaka*, II, 139 ; III, pp. 129, 257, 326 & 444 ; V, 212 ; 293 ; Cf. *Acārāṅga Sūtra*, I, 2, 5, 1.

[22] *Jātaka*, iii, 445.

[23] *Ibid.* I, pp. 200, 225, 350.

[24] *Ibid.* I, p. 451 ;

[25] *Jātaka*, vi. p. 117.

[26] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 220.

[27] *Ibid.*, vi, pp. 462, 464, 508, etc.

[28] *Ibid.*, I, p. 200.

[29] *Ibid*, VI. p. 389.

to the category of slaves[30]. A master had an absolute right over his slave[31]. A female slave was considered as one of the members of the household[32]. A master was courteous enough to accept the words of his slave with due honour[33]. Slaves were permitted to learn reading and writing and handicrafts along with the sons of their masters[34]. Sometimes they were appointed as store-keepers or guards of property[35]. In some instances the suffering and happiness of the slaves were linked up with those of their masters.[36] For the slightest fault a slave was beaten, imprisoned and branded[37]. A female slave was thrown down at the door of the house and beaten with rope-ends by her master because she could not bring home her wages[38]. The slaves could be rightfully given away to another[39]. Some runaway slaves were seeking opportunity to free themselves from the clutches of their masters[40]. Slaves could regain freedom on payment[41] or through voluntary manumission by their masters[42]. A slave was ordinarily engaged in cooking[43], fetching water[44], pounding and drying rice[45], carrying food and watching the field[46], giving alms[47], handing plates and dishes,

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[30] *Ibid.*, iv, pp. 320, 362.
[31] *Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 360 ; *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[32] *Ibid.*, iii, p. 162.
[33] *Ibid.*, v, pp. 485-86.
[34] *Ibid.*, I, p. 451.
[35] *Ibid.*, I, p. 225.
[36] *Ibid.*, vi, p. 285.
[37] *Ibid.*, I, p. 451.
[38] *Ibid.*, I, 402.
[39] *Ibid.*, vi. 285.
[40] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 452, 458.
[41] *Ibid.*, vi, p. 547.
[42] *Ibid.*, v, p. 313.
[43] *Ibid.*, v, 105.
[44] *Jātaka*, v, 284, 413.
[45] *Ibid.*, I, 484.
[46] *Ibid.*, iii, 168.
[47] *Ibid.*, iv, 67.

bringing spittoon and fetching fans during meals[48], and sweeping the yards and stables[49]. Slavery was so common that not only the kings and wealthy people but also the Brahmins and recluses and villagers and farmers kept slaves in their custody[50].

Slaves (*dāsā*) were drawn from all classes under various circumstances. Their lot was miserable and their status low. But in spite of all that, they occupied a position in society. They could not be regarded as impure because they had to work for their masters in manifold household duties like helping their masters in dressing and undressing, assisting in the carė of their bodies, preparing and serving food and cleansing the house. They were not counted as a caste.

Female slaves could be emancipated only with the consent of their masters. The position of a female slave was rather pitiful. A slave woman like a Roman slave-girl was the property of her master who had every control over her. She was generally illtreated. A painful instance of ill-treatment is found in the *Majjhima Nikāya*. A woman named Kālī was the maid servant of a householder's wife living at Śrāvastī. She was skilful, and capable of doing her duties well. Kālī in order to test whether the fame of her mistress as a gentle and considerate lady was due to her or not once rose late in the morning. Her mistress showed her dissatisfaction at this. On the second day she rose up late and was rebuked. On the third day she rose up still very late and was so severely beaten by her mistress that her head was broken[51].

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48. *Ibid*, I, 453.
49. *Ibid.*, vi. 138.
50. *Ibid.*, ii, 428 ; iii, 101 ; v, 105 ; vi, 117.
51. *Majjhima Nikāya*, i, pp. 125 ff. ; Cf. *Vimānavatthu Commentary*, pp. 206 ff.

In addition to other household duties, a slave-woman husked paddy[52], pounded rice[53], and went to market[54].

A slave-woman could obtain freedom if she could prove herself worthy of it. A daughter of Anāthapiṇḍika's slave was given freedom when she defeated a Brahmin in argument and proved herself to be a woman of religious disposition[55].

The consent of the master was necessary for the marriage of his female slaves. Pasenadi, king of Kosala, had to secure the consent of the master before he could marry Mallikā, the daughter of a slave woman.

Maid-servants being of low birth were naturally uncultured and of low spirits. Some of them were in the habit of stealing coins or articles. But the influence of the Buddha's *dharma* had a splendid effect on their character[56].

It is not a fact that the Buddha had not exerted himself in the interest of the slaves and servants. The fact that bondage and indebtedness were held as positive disqualifications for admission into the Buddhist religious order and fraternity[57] is not to be pressed as an argument. The slaves and debtors were excluded because the Buddha wanted to see Brotherhood founded by him as an association of free men. Among the philosophers and religious teachers who pleaded for the cause of equality and liberty, the Buddha ranked foremost if he was not the pioneer of the movement. He described servitude (*dāsavyaṁ*) as a most painful state of woe along with debt (*iṇaṁ*), imprisonment (*bandhanāgāraṁ-prison*), illness (*rogaṁ*), and journey

[52] *Dhammapada Commy.*, iii, 321.

[53] *Jātaka* No. 45.

[54] *Dhammapada Commy.*, i, 208.

[55] *Therīgāthā Commy.* pp. 199 ff.

[56] *Dhammapada Commy.* I, 208 ff.; *Mahāvaṁsa*, 214; *Vimānavatthu Commy.*, 45-47, 91-92.

[57] *Vinaya Piṭaka*, i. p. 76—*Na bhikkhave iṇāyiko pabbājetabbo ......Na bhikkhave dāso pabbājetabbo.*

through a wilderness[58] (*kantāraddhānamaggaṁ*). He completely refrained from accepting male and female slaves (*Dāsī-dāsa-paṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato*)[59]. He prohibited traffic in human beings (*sattevaṇijjā*) or slave-trade on the part of the *upāsakas*[60]. In accordance with a clear Jātaka maxim no man should offer himself to slavery. In order to ameliorate the condition of slaves and servants (dāsa-kammakarā) the Buddha laid down the five essential duties of a noble householder towards them, namely, "employing them according to their capacity, giving them proper meals and wages, attending them in times of illness, sharing with them delicacies and special dishes, and occasionally granting them leave"[61].

It may be said that the religious movement in India prior to Manu was directed to obtain emancipation from all kinds of bondage, physical, moral, intellectual or spiritual. A change took place along with the Brahmanical re-action against liberal and progressive thoughts. Slavery, instead of being abolished, came to be regarded as a necessary social institution. The classes of slaves increased in number, and there is no evidence of any attempt being made to improve their position in life.

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[58] *Dīgha Nikāya*, i, p. 73

[59] *Dīgha*, i, p.5.

[60] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, iii, p. 208: *Imā kho bhikkhave pañca vaṇijjā upāsakena akaraṇīyāti.*

[61]. *Dīgha Nikāya*, iii. p. 191.

"Yathābalaṁ kammanta-samvidhānena, bhatta-vettanānuppadānena, gilānupaṭṭhānena accbariyānaṁ vasānaṁ sambibhāgena, samaye vossaggena."

MARRIAGE IN OLD AND MEDIEVAL BENGAL ACCORDING TO SMṚTI NIBANDHAS

By SURES CHANDRA BANERJI

(*Continued from Vol. V. Pt. 4*)

DIVORCE in the truest sense of the term means a complete dissolution of the marriage tie. We have seen above that even in cases where a marriage is void *ab initio*, which is good ground for divorce, the wife is not deprived of her maintenance so that the marriage is not dissolved. At best, the desertion of the wife in the circumstances mentioned above means only a judicial separation of the bed and board of the husband and wife who cannot claim a restitution of conjugal rights against each other.

Divorce proper, however, seems to have been enjoined even by Raghunandana, on the strength of certain authorities in extreme cases of adultery of wives. Instead of being punished physically the wife shall be deserted for the following offences:—

1. Commission of adultery with a man of inferior caste resulting in her pregnancy.
2. Adultery with disciple (of the husband ?) and son.
3. Addiction to other heinous vices and causing waste of wealth.

As regards the punishment for the first offence the verdict of Bṛhaspati is the severest. He says that she may either be deserted or even killed. Raghunandana is not so unrelenting in this matter because he cites a verse that such a wife may be purified by penances so long as she does not conceive. Anyway, none of the texts dwelling upon the desertion of the wife for her adultery makes any provision whatsoever for her maintenance. Thus adultery seems to be the only ground for proper divorce according to the smṛti digests of Bengal.

So far as the prohibitory rules in marriage are concerned the doctrine of factum valet applies to a great extent.

Scope of Factum Valet.

In all the above cases except where a marriage is void the marriage, once performed, is not invalidated by the mere non-observance of the directory rules. Even in the guardianship of marriage, which is one of the most important factors, factum valet operates to the fullest extent in the Bengal school. The one great condition for a person to be fit for offering a girl in marriage is that he must be free from the defects of insanity, apostacy, etc. as pointed out above. Otherwise according to Nārada, the act done by him will be regarded as not done. Raghunandana, the practical jurist of Bengal, here shows a flash of originality in construing Nārada's authority as annulling only such acts as betrothal, etc. when done by persons having any of the above draw-backs. He argues that the ceremony of marriage being the primary thing can never be annulled, when once performed, due simply to such secondary things as the defects of the giver.[54] He is, however, not clear as to the results of a marriage where the person offering the girl is not included in the list of legal guardians.

The smṛti writers of Bengal have made a good deal of astrological speculation about the auspicious times for marriage.

Suitable time for marriage.

The months from Āṣāḍha to Kārtika and the months of Pauṣa and Caitra are prohibited in general as marriage in these months is supposed to forebode different kinds of misfortune, but the two months last named are particularly tabooed. In abnormal circumstances, however, such as war, imminent death of parents, and the girl's exceeding the highest limit of marriageable age one should not

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[54] यदि तु विवाहो निवृत्तस्तदा प्रधानस्य निष्पन्नत्वेनाधिकारिवैकल्यान्न तस्य पुनरावृत्तिरिति—*Udvāha-tattva.* p. 121.

wait for auspicious time. But Raghunandana seems to be inclined to the view that in all cases particularly bad times such as Malamāsa and Sankrānti etc. are to be avoided at any cost even if bad months are left out of consideration. A girl should be married away within the even number of years from conception in her mother's womb. According to Raghunandana one should take into account the solar month i.e., the period of Sun's stay in a Zodiac. This means that in citing the mantras in a marriage one should mention the solar month in which the ceremony takes place. From the work of Gopāla Nyāyapañcānana it seems that Śrīnātha-ācārya-Cūḍāmaṇi held the opposite view that the lunar month should be mentioned. On certain authorities Raghunandana shows that although gifts in general are condemned by night yet for the gift of a girl night is the best time. Marriage by day is strictly prohibited.

Marriage when complete.

It is an interesting part of the discussion on marriage as to what is the precise point of time when a Hindu marriage can be technically said to be complete. While neither his predecessors nor his successors bother themselves much about this particular question Raghunandana, with the true insight of a jurist, tries to determine the particular act which completes the ceremony of marriage. A marriage is said to come to an end with the change of the bride's gotra to that of her husband. But there is a good deal of controversy regarding the exact point of time when the Gotra is changed. While according to Laghuhārīta[55] a bride's Gotra is changed after the ceremony of Saptapadīgamana (i.e. taking of seven steps together by the bridegroom and the bride) she takes the new Gotra after Pāṇi-grahaṇa (bridegroom's taking the hands of the

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[55] स्वगोत्राद्भ्रश्यते नारी विवाहात् सप्तमे पदे—quoted in the *Udvāhatattva* p. 136.

bride) according to Bṛhaspati. The view that the father's gotra of a married woman is not changed so long as her śrāddha called Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa is not performed, has been characterised by Raghunandana as being applicable only to persons belonging to certain limited branches of certain Vedas. The injunction of Gobhila[3] which requires a woman after Sapta-padī-gamana to salute her husband by the "gotra" raises the doubt as to whose gotra should be mentioned by the said woman—that of her father or that of her husband. Here Raghunandana, on the authority of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, who was probably one of his paternal ancestors, interprets Gobhila's text as referring to the husband's gotra and not to that of the father of the girl as interpreted by Bhavadeva and some other writers. Again, on Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's authority Raghunandana proves that the marriage ceremony of the Brāhmaṇas belonging to the Sāma-veda comes to an end with this salutation by the wife. The ceremony of Yajurvedī Brāhmaṇas, however, is complete with the sitting together of the bride and the groom on a piece of bull-skin.

Dowry and bride's price.

The acceptance of bride's price (Śulka) by the father of the bride is so severely condemned that the father receiving Śulka is said to fall into worst of hells and also to plunge seven generations into sin. This practice is prohibited even for Śūdras. The silence of Bengal writers on bridegroom's dowry can perhaps be explained by the wide prevalence of Kulinism in Bengal. As stated above it was at one time considered very good for a girl to have a Kulin husband. Among the Kulins again a great rigidity attached to the rule that a Kulin girl, belonging to a particular section (Mela), must be married to a Kulin Brāhmaṇa

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[58] अनुमंत्रिता गुरुं गोत्रेणाभिवादयेत्— *Gobhila Gṛhya-sūtra*, Ed. Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra, Calcutta, 1908. Vol. I. p. 335 (II. 3.13)

of the same section. These rules naturally resulted in the comparative dearth of bridegrooms. Hence the demand for Kulin bridegrooms was far in excess of the supply of brides. Thus the question of supply and demand adjusted the respective prices of bridegrooms and brides. While the latter were extremely cheap the former had to be purchased at a very high price which was very often prohibitive with the result that sometimes a poor Brāhmaṇa became utterly destitute in marrying his daughter to a Kulin husband. There seems to have been a social necessity for condemning the practice of accepting bride's price. Partly from fear of degradation and partly to elevate their position in society the Brāhmaṇas at one time selected Kulin bridegrooms for their daughters. This resulted in the plurality of wives in the case of Kulins and a dearth of brides for the non-kulins so that the latter in their quest for suitable brides were compelled to resort to the reprehensible practice of purchasing girls.

On the authority of Yājñavalkya Raghunandana ordains that with regard to the offering of their sisters in marriage only those of the brothers who are initiated shall have the sole authority in the absence of other preferential guardians. The same verse of Yājñavalkya requires all brothers, irrespective of initiation, to contribute Turīyaka of Nijāṁśa (own share) towards the marriage of sisters. Now the word Turīyaka has puzzled many writers both of the Dāyabhāga and Mitākṣarā schools. The sum and substance of the elaborate, and sometimes bewildering, discussion of the Mitākṣarā on the word Turīyaka is that it means a fourth part of the share that would have been allotted to the girl concerned had she been a male child. Thus when there are four brothers and one sister the ancestral property shall be divided into five equal parts and the brothers shall spend an amount equivalent to $\frac{1}{4}$ of $\frac{1}{5}$ of the property in the marriage of the sister. The remaining portion of $\frac{1}{5}$ i.e.

$\frac{1}{5} - \frac{1}{20}$ ($= \frac{3}{20}$) shall be equally distributed among the brothers. In arriving at this conclusion, which is certainly very plausible, the Mitākṣarā raises many other interpretations that may possibly be put on this word and cleverly demonstrates the absurdity of each. The Dāyabhāga, followed by no less a person than Raghunandana himself, cuts the Gordian Knot and takes the word to imply 'Vivāhocita-dravya' or things sufficient for the ceremony of marriage. Śūlapāṇi's view is rather vague.

The Bengal school had always a strong disfavour for the idea of giving any share of paternal property to girls and in this case also perhaps the psychology working behind the distorted meaning of the word Turīyaka, which can mean nothing but a fourth part, was that by accepting the real meaning the Bengal jurists might expose themselves to the risk of allotting a definite share of the property to girls. It is probable that to obviate all sorts of complications that might arise in future they resorted to this ludicrous way of explaining Yājñavalkya's text.

The husband cannot use his wife for sexual gratification whenever he likes. In this matter he must have a great consideration for the feelings of his wife. It is his bounden duty to cohabit with his wife after each of her monthly courses until she conceives. In doing so he must avoid the festive occasions (Parva-varjam).

Among the faults of wives are mentioned drinking, association with undesirable persons, separation from husband, sauntering here and there, untimely sleep, and residence at others' houses. A woman during separation from her husband, who may leave home on some errands, shall, besides praying for his welfare, abstain from excessive decorations but must not, in any case, altogether forsake ornaments lest she should look like a widow.

We can have glimpses of some very interesting customs in connection with marriage some of them being

utterly inexplicable. The father of a girl shall not take his meal at her house till a son is born to her[57]. The prohibition is stricter when the girl is married according to the Brāhma form of marriage. The rule prohibiting a girl from eating at the husband's house after taking meal at her father's residence appears meaningless unless we take it to imply that a newly married girl should not eat at both places in the course of the same day. But the object of this injunction is obscure though it may be supposed to have some justification from the hygienic point of view.

Customs and superstitions in connection with marriage.

The peculiar sound known as Huludhvani[58] made by women on festive occasions is regarded in Bengal as very auspicious in marriage also. None of the authoritative Nibandhakāras of Bengal excepting Raghunandana refers to Huludhvani—a fact which probably shows that it was too well-known to need any Śāstric injunction. Raghunandana with his meticulous attention to details could not perhaps remain satisfied without pointing out the authority on which this custom was based. Raghunandana citing the authority of the southerners seems to support the view that sneezing, though generally regarded as very ominous, is auspicious, in the seven acts viz. Vivāha etc. It seems to have been customary for both the bridegroom and the bride to get shaved before marriage only the cutting of nails being prescribed for the bride. In sacred rites such as marriage the uttering of words like Svasti Puṇyāha etc. by Brāhmaṇas is considered very auspicious. The

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[57] It may be noted that this custom prevails even to-day particularly in some parts of East Bengal.

[58] The term Ululi meaning the same thing occurs in the *Atharvaveda* (III. 19.6). The later lexicographers spell the word variously as Hulahulī, Hulibulī and Huluhulu. Also see *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (III. 19.3) and *Naiṣadha-carita*, XIV. 51. For an interesting and informative discussion on Huludhvani see K. K. Handiqui: *Eng. Tr. of the Naiṣadha-carita*, pp. 541-2.

modes of uttering these words differ in the cases of different castes.

Raghunandana refers to the custom of wearing on the forehead the mark of mixture of cowdung, cow's urine, curd and sandal paste as this mark is supposed to bring good luck and cause freedom from diseases. But he is not clear as to the person who should wear it although from the commentary it seems to have been a rule for the bride.

The custom of the bride and bridegroom looking at each other's face known as Jambula-mālikā or Mukha-Candrikā[59] during the progress of the ceremony is hinted at by Raghunandana.

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[59] The custom of the bride and the groom looking at each other's face known as Mukhacandrikā and Śubha-dṛṣṭi in eastern and western Bengal respectively, still prevails as an indispensable part of the ceremony. It is, however, not known how the word Jambula-mālikā, obviously meaning a garland of Jambula (Ketaka ?) flowers, acquired the sense of Mukha-candrikā which means Mukha-darśanam according to Raghunandana. By quoting a verse from the *Harivaṁśa*, which contains the word Jambula-mālikā Raghunandana remarks that the verse refers to the practice of bringing the bride and the groom face to face, in which garlands of flowers were used. This suggests that the term Jambula-mālikā, originally meaning a garland, gradually came to signify the part of the ceremony in which such a garland was tô be used. Nilakaṇṭha, however, in his commentary on the *Harivaṁśa* interprets Jambula-mālikā as jesting compliments addressed to the bridegroom by his female relatives (वरपक्षीयस्त्रीणां परिहासवचनं तेषां म लिका श्रेणी), but does not speak of the particular point of the ceremony when these jesting complements were actually addressed to the bride-groom. This interpretation of Nilakaṇṭha seems to imply that the practice of the female relatives of the bridegroom accompanying him to the bride's house prevailed in those times, otherwise the presence of the former at the marriage ceremony, which as a general rule, was performed at the bride's house becomes unlikely. The fact that Raghunandana says nothing in this connection about these female relatives of the bridegroom accompanying him in the bridal procession probably indicates that the custom in course of time died out at least in Bengal. It may be added that in a Bengal marriage no female used to accompany the bridegroom to the bride's house though of late the custom is found rather widely particularly in western Bengal and rarely also in the eastern part of the Province. The Bengal writers preceding and succeeding Raghunandana is silent on Mukha-candrikā.

Among the customs after marriage is mentioned the practice of the mother-in-law receiving the daughter-in-law with clothes, refreshments etc. The mother-in-law should moreover engage her to religious duties, cook ing and supervision of the household articles. It is interesting to note that these customs survive in Bengal even to-day although sometimes in slightly modified forms. These modifications are very often ludicrous and indicate the degeneration of the present day Hindus who are concerned only with the letter and not the spirit of the rules. For example, fathers, unable to disoblige the daughter's new relation, takes meals at the houses of daughters and pays a pice or two as if to show that they have taken food in exchange of money which they can do everywhere. But this is only self-deception. Again we see that a girl when leaving her father's house for the first time after marriage is provided with some quantity of foodstuff for her use at the time of taking her first meal at the husband's house. But these articles are seldom or never used for this purpose.

Besides those mentioned above many other customs, popularly known as Strī-ācāra, are observed in a Bengal marriage of the present day. Some of them may probably be traced to the primitive stage of civilisation. For instance, sometimes we meet with certain charms designed to enable the wife to have the husband completely under her control (cf. Vaśī-karaṇa-mantras). These lead one to suppose that customs of this nature probably mark a compromise between the Aryan and the non-Aryan practices.

The texts do not show any sign of these customs having any legal force so that a breach of these rules has got nothing to do with the validity or otherwise of a marriage. But these women's practices or Strī-ācāras are more than law to women who will consider a marriage irregular without the observance of these minor customs.

With regard to the place where marriage can be performed nothing is specifically mentioned so far as Sāmavedi marriage is concerned. The Yajurvedi Brāhmaṇas should hold the ceremony in the compound of the main residential house after thoroughly cleansing and purifying the compound and placing fire in it.

Places suitable for the ceremony of marriage.

The importance of marriage as a sacrament is no less than that of other saṁskāras as Upanayana etc. It will be erroneous to suppose that the Hindus looked upon marriage as merely a means of sexual enjoyment. Nor was marriage regarded as an act that could be done absolutely at one's sweet will. In he well-disciplined and regulated life of the Hindus marriage was a sacred and bounden duty of every Dvija (twice born) in the second stage (Gārhasthya-āśrama) of life. For the Śūdra there was only one stage of the householder. A house-holder without a wife was a contradiction in terms for "house" has been declared as nothing but the wife herself.[60] Thus a householder without a wife is without a house so to say. In fact the words Sahadharmiṇī and such other synonyms of Bhāryā imply that the wife is the counterpart of a man and without her his life is imperfect, so much so that a man without his wife is precluded from performing many of the rites enjoined by the Śāstras. These are the reasons why marriage at the due time is very strongly advocated. One should never remain out of one or other of the four Āśramas; otherwise he will be doomed to perdition. This point is emphasised by Raghunandana but is not dwelt upon by the earlier and later writers. This seems to indicate that at least in Raghunandana's time in Bengal life-long celibacy was looked down. It will be seen later that one might remain a bachelor for whole life but in that case he would have to abandon the

Importance of marriage.

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[60] न गृहं गृहमित्याहुर्गृहिणी गृहमुच्यते—*Udvāha-tattva.*

duties of a householder and perform those of a sannyāsin. The āśramas are four for Brāhmaṇas, three for Kṣatriyas, two for Vaiśyas and only one for Śūdras. The above rule clearly indicates that one should not defer marriage as well as other Saṁskāras when they become due.

Here a question naturally arises as to what should be the position of an old widower who by losing his wife becomes an Anāśramin or fallen from āśramas. Here Raghunandana cites an authority which designates a widower aged forty-eight and above as Raṇḍāśramin so that when he loses his wife he is fallen from the Gṛhastha-āśrama no doubt but for him is created a fifth āśrama called Raṇḍā. This is certainly an ingenious contrivance evidently designed to enable such a man to perform certain śāstric duties which a man without an āśrama is not entitled to do. By citing this authority Raghunandana seems to discourage the reprehensible practice of marrying one's daughter to an old man who may even be an octogenarian. Marriage being such an important institution we find certain noteworthy exceptions to the rule of Parivedana and also certain other important rules. It has been pointed out above that although Parivedana is highly sinful yet a man marrying before his elder brother who willingly abstains from marriage when it is due does not incur any sin whatsoever. Then again impurity (Aśauca) consequent upon the death of parents, though an obstacle to the performance of most of the religious duties, does not stand in the way of one's marriage when it is one's due. So long as a suitable bride is not available a man fit for marriage should perform the duties of a snātaka. If he is a sannyāsin he will, of course, be devoted to the duties of Sannyāsa and shall not take a wife like the Gṛhastha.

The sacredness of the institution of marriage is emphasised by Srīnātha, who cites a number of authoritative texts in support of his view, by saying that only that man

has a right to marry who, with untarnished Brahmacarya, prosecuted the Vedic studies strictly according to the rules enjoined by the Śāstras. This necessarily implies, as Śrīnātha points out, that a man, once fallen from Brahmacarya, must perform the requisite penances before he can be entitled to enter into the second stage of life, viz., Gārhasthya. These rules at once show that marriage in those times required a great sense of responsibility in one who intended to marry and was not an arbitrary and rash act of thoughtless youngmen.

Śrīnātha further holds, on the authority of Manu and others, that the second stage of life or Gārhasthya, of which the taking of a wife forms an essential part, is superior to the three other āśramas. It is the Gṛhastha who is expected to support the members of other āśramas so as to enable them to go on with their own duties by providing them with food and shelter whenever necessary.

Kanyā Sampradāna—Merits of.

Many are the benefits accruing from the proper gift of a daughter in the midst of tumultuous sounds of various musical instruments, these last being supposed to drive away all evils. Besides attaining heaven for eternity the giver of a daughter in marriage enjoys many other advantages in the world hereafter.

Effects of betrothal.

Raghunandana's attitude is that it is marriage and not mere betrothal that causes a man's ownership over the bride so that a contract of betrothal can be avoided under certain circumstances and there can be no specific performance though damages are sometimes allowed to the aggrieved party. Although there are authorities prohibiting a man from withholding the marriage of a girl who is betrothed yet such withholding is allowed if it is for the interest of the girl, e.g. when the nominated bridegroom proves to be impotent and otherwise an undesirable person. If a man after paying Śulka to the girl, who is betrothed to himself,

goes away to a foreign land and does not return within a year the girl may be married away to another man. The contract of betrothal is irrevocable under special circumstances. A bridegroom refusing to marry a faultless girl betrothed to him shall have to undergo pecuniary punishment besides being compelled to marry that particular girl. The father withholding a girl after betrothal without sufficient cause and thus violating the contract shall suffer punishment besides paying, with interest, whatever money was spent by the proposed bridegroom in giving ornaments etc. to the bride. In the event of the bride's death the person to whom she was betrothed shall take back what-ever he gave the bride after, of course, adjusting the expenses incurred in this connection by both parties. Thus betrothal is sometimes an irrevocable contract and the welfare of the girl in question plays a considerable part in making such a contract irrevocable.

The position of slaves, described by Raghunandana in the Udvāha-tattva, is rather interesting. Slaves are of two kinds—

Slavery and marriage.

1. Bhaktadāsa-one becoming a slave for food.

2. Baḍavākṛta-one becoming a slave by marrying the woman slave of somebody.

Woman-slaves are also of two classes:—

1. A woman not originally a slave but enslaved by the master of the slave who marries her.

2. A woman who herself becomes a slave.

The first kind of woman-slave naturally becomes the slave of her husband's master. A woman slave of one master, i.e. a woman slave of the second class, being married to a man slave of the other remains a slave of her own master, but her husband's master may have proprietory rights over her at the permission of the former. The man slave in this case is not transferred to his wife's master.

The children born of such a union should be distributed equally among the two masters. Those begotten on a woman slave by any person (who is not a slave) except her husband are in the possession of her master and not of the person giving birth to them.

The way in which Raghunandana deals with slavery here tends to show that slavery prevailed in his time and that slaves were regarded as mere chattels.

Eight forms of marriage seem to have been recognised in India from a very remote date. In the form called Brāhma the bridegroom is invited and the girl, adorned with ornaments according to the father's capacity, is given away to him: The child born of such a union is believed to sanctify not only itself but also ten generations both upwards and downwards, i.e. twenty-one generations in all.

Forms of marriage.

The Daiva is that form in which the girl is given away to a Ṛtvik engaged in sacrifices and in the Ārṣa form the giver of the girl presents a couple of cows received from the bridegroom. The children of these couples sanctify fourteen and six generations respectively.

That form of marriage is called Prājāpatya in which the gift of the girl is preceded by the words meaning "Practise religion jointly." The children born of such a couple purify six generations.

In an Āsura marriage the giver of the girl accepts from the bridegroom money exceeding the amount prescribed by Śāstras and a Gāndharva marriage takes place at the mutual agreement of the bridegroom and the bride independently of their respective guardians.

The bridegroom's forcibly taking away the bride constitutes the Rākṣasa marriage while in the eighth and the meanest form, viz. Paiśāca, a man willing to marry a girl outrages her modesty while she is asleep, intoxicated, or otherwise loses control over herself.

The first five (or according to some four) forms were regarded as approved forms and the rest as disapproved ones.

From this account we are not in a position to know which forms were actually in vogue in the Hindu society of Bengal as depicted by Raghunandana. But unlike the writers of Dharmaśāstras Raghunandana and his predecessors and successors in Bengal smrti say nothing about the suitability of particular forms to particular castes.

Nāndīmukha Śrāddha.

By quoting a series of smṛti texts and introducing subtle discussions of a purely academic nature Raghunandana concludes that the beginning of the caremony of marriage is marked by the Nāndīmukha or Vṛddhi Śrāddha which is obligatory. This Śrāddha is to be performed by the father in the recognised ceremonies (Saṁskāras) of both the son and the daughter. In the case of the son the father should perform Śrāddha only on the occasion of his marrying for the first time and not in his subsequent marriages if any, which cannot be included among Saṁskāras because he becomes Samskṛta by the first marriage; it is enjoined that Vṛddhi-Śrāddha should be performed only once before a particular Saṁskāra.

In Vṛddhi-Śrāddha the father should offer piṇḍas to his three male ancestors in each of the paternal and maternal lines. As regards the Śrāddha of the three maternal ancestors it is inferred from a verse of Vṛddha-Yājñavalkya. The father being unable to perform Vṛddhi-śrāddha due to his sojourn abroad or any physical indisposition his son or any one specifically empowered by the Śāstras may perform it as his representative though not formally appointed by him. Persons other than the father shall perform the Srāddha of the ancestors of the father and not of those of themselves, that is to say, they will perform Śrāddha exactly of those persons to whom the father, if able,

would have offered piṇḍas. In the event of the father's death or subsequent marriages of the son the son himself shall perform Vṛddhi-śrāddha. He will not, of course, offer piṇḍas to the father who may be alive. Without Vṛddhi-Śrāddha Vivāha remains impure; hence it must be performed also by grand-father etc. who may have to give away their grand-daughter in marriage. The mother, however, herself making Kanyā-sampradāna shall not perform this Śrāddha to which woman as a class are not entitled.

Here Raghunandana raises a controversy as to whether a Sāmavedi Brāhmaṇa should perform Vṛddhi-Śrāddha separately of the female ancestors. By introducing a series of arguments and counter-arguments he shows that no separate Śrāddha of any female is to be performed in any case except in her death anniversaries.

SANSKRIT DRAMA IN A COMPARATIVE LIGHT

By K. C. Pandey

(*Continued from Vol.* V. pt. 4.)

Unity of Fable or Action

Unity of fable in the sense of its oneness, according to Aristotle, consists not in the whole series of incidents being related to one man or one time, but in its being logically connected with one end, in each succeeding member of the series being necessarily or probably being connected with the preceding. Tragedy is the highest product of the imitative art. Artistic imitation is imitation of one thing only, not only in the case of the art of painting but also in that of tragedy. The only difference in the latter case is that it imitates not one thing but one action. This must be a whole, the parts of which are so related with one another that if any one of them be displaced or taken away the whole will become wholly different or changed.

Unities of Time and Place

The unity of place and the unity of time imply such division of the original plot into presentable and unpresentable that the presentable part which has to be addressed to the eyes and not to the ears, is concerned with incidents which may be represented as happening in one single place and at one single time. They also imply conveying information through the ears to the audience about such incidents as are unpresentable in or through action by such means as chorus, messenger and prologue etc.

The unities of time and place were necessary in Greek drama because of its peculiar constitution. Chorus was an important part of it. It remained in the orchestra even

during the interval between two episodes. It was represented by a group of elders who were sympathisers of the hero and therefore to whom he expressed his thoughts and feelings. It represented spectators in the drama. The whole tragedy, therefore, from prologue to exode was naturally one single continuous scene without any break such as could permit the change of place and time.

Conception of Action in English Drama

English dramatists have considerably modified Aristotelian conception of Dramatic Action. They do not recognise "manners" or moral habits and sentiments, the discussive energy of reason, as the sources of dramatic action. The heroes of English tragedies are not necessarily men of strict moral principles. Some of them have no moral principles. English dramatists present "Character" manifesting itself in action such as logically leads them to tragic end. They, substitute character for manners. They present an individual whose individuality is made up of a multiplicity of physical, intellectual, moral and even immoral tendencies. These tendencies of an individual constitute his character. According to Aristotle, manners were not essential for tragedy. For, he recognised even such tragedies as are without manners. Thus while, according to Aristotle there could be a tragedy without manners, according to English dramatists there can be no tragedy without character.

Comparison

If we retain Aristotelian conception of perfect action, which implies perfect agent; and substitute *basic mental state* or *basic emotion* for character in the English conception of tragic action, we would have a clear conception of action in Sanskrit Drama. Action in Sanskrit Drama is a series of actions, which springs from a basic emotive tendency,

aroused by a situation, in which an ideal person finds himself. With such a conception of action in his mind, Sanskrit Dramatist, cannot logically present the hero as meeting a tragic end. Hence there is no tragedy in Sanskrit.

Similarity in the Method of Treatment of the Subject Matter

Bharata does not expound a theory of Drama. He does not treat drama philosophically. He is not concerned with any metaphysical, ethical or logical principles, in terms of which he has to present his views. His point of view is practical and not theoretical. He does not expound, but speaks aphoristically to instruct the would be dramatists.

Let us, therefore, see on what lines , he wants the would be dramatists to be instructed. Suppose some one specially gifted to write a drama discovers a story, historical or otherwise, fit in every way for dramatic presentation. The question arises : what should he do to dramatise it ? Should he reproduce all the historical facts or should he modify them in some way ? If the latter be the case, on what lines should the modification proceed ?

The first thing for dramatisation of a set of events, historical, contemporary or imaginative, is to fix upon what is going to be the object of achievement, and who is to be represented to achieve it. In short, first of all the plot should be analysed with a view to determine upon the hero of the piece and the object of his achievement. The value of such an analysis is obvious. Once the hero is chosen, he has naturally got to receive more attention and has to be kept in the forefront, relegating all others, whatever their importance, into the back-ground. Such a question, therefore as is generally raised in the case of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, "who is the hero of the piece, Brutus or Caesar" cannot arise in the case of Sanskrit drama.

Once the plot has been analysed in the above manner, more attention has naturally to be given to the central theme. The main story represents the hero achieving one of the goals recognised by the Indian Society. But no achievement is possible without any serious effort on the part of the ambitious. Action, therefore, is an essential part of the story. Hence the question that naturally arises, is, how is the action to be presented or what is the method to be followed in the presentation thereof, i. e. what method does Bharata, as interpreted by Abhinava, suggest for adoption in this case?

The reply is that the presentation of action has to be in consonance with the basic mental state, which is primarily intended to be presented. Therefore, only as much action as can go with such mental state, lead to it and reveal it as far as possible, admits of presentation in a Sanskrit Drama. It is, however, necessary for maintaining the unity of the story as a whole, not entirely to ignore or leave out those portions, which do not go with the intensity of emotion or feeling. Accordingly the action has to be divided into two kinds. (i) that which is to be actually presented on the stage (Dṛśya) and (ii) that which is simply to be hinted at or communicated (Sūcya).

The former is to be kept very distinct from the latter. For it is on this basis that the dramatic story is divided into acts (Aṅka) and the informative scenes of different kinds which, according to the need of the occasion are introduced either in the beginning or at the end of different acts, such as (i) Viṣkambhaka, (ii) Cūlikā, (iii) Aṅkāsya, (iv) Aṅkāvatāra and (v) Praveśaka. Accordingly such actions, as long journey, battle, rebellion, feast etc. are not to be presented.

This method of division of action of the plot is accepted by Aristotle. The means of communicating the unpresentable according to Aristotle are prologue, chorus and messengers.

Unities of Time and Place Maintained in each Act

We shall be able to understand better the importance of this method of presentation in the eyes of Sanskrit dramatists, if we take into account the following facts:—

Sanskrit dramatist takes the greatest possible care not to introduce anything on the stage, which is likely to shock the spectator's sense of reality of the presented. The stage, being of the limited size and the drama being intended to be presented within a fixed duration of time, he does not present on the stage all such things as do not fit in with the temporal and spatial limitations of the stage presentation. He, therefore, naturally has to content himself with giving information about such things as big battles, long journeys and rebellion etc., through the informatory scenes.

He has to maintain the unity of time and consequently of space within each act of drama. For, the dramatic action, according to Indian dramaturgist, has to be divided into five parts, on the basis of five stages of action; and each stage has to be presented in a separate act. The continuity of the dramatised story has to be maintained, after the end of an act through introduction[1] of Bindu (recollection of purpose) which is like a thread and strings together the various stages of action, presented separately in separate acts.

The action and events, presented in an act ought to be such as do not extend over more than five Muhūrtas[2]. For, that is just the duration of time, for which the actors can act and spectators can[3] witness the performance at a stretch, without feeling any inconvenience, due to interference with the daily natural routine. Thus, if the events and action connected with one stage of action be such as

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[1] *A. Bh. Ch.* 19 (20?) V. 13 (MS). [2] S. *C.*, 635.

[3] *A. Bh. Ch.* 19 (20) V. 24. (MS).

consistently with unity of time, cannot be presented in one act, there are two ways of dealing with such a part of story—

(i) It may be split up into two acts.

(ii) The less important parts of it may be presented in informatory scene[4].

It may be pointed out here that the informatory scene also cannot cover a period of more than a year[5]. And even if in the original story the events be scattered over a longer period, the dramatist has to modify the plot so as to compress them within the prescribed time.

Just as the principle of unity of time is maintained within an act so the principle of unity of place also is upheld within the same. The scenes of action within an act cannot lie so far apart from one another as cannot be reached by the hero within the time necessary for presentation of act. If they be far distant from one another they have to be presented in separate acts. If after an event or action that is presented in an act, there is to be presented another which is related to a far distant place, so that the hero cannot reach within the time limit of an act, the act should terminate with the presentation of the hero as starting on his journey. But if the hero has got the means of transport e.g. aeroplane such as can enable him to reach far distant places within the prescribed time, the scenes of action lying far apart may be presented within the same act.[6]

Thus it is clear that the statement of Professor Keith in his "Sanskrit Drama" that Sanskrit dramatists were ignorant of the principles of unities of time and place, is based upon his own ignorance of the dramatic technique in Sanskrit drama.

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[4] *N.* S. 228.

[5] *N.* S. 228.

[6] *A. Bh. Ch.* 19 (20) (?) V. 30 (MS).

As regards the principle of unity of action in Sanskrit drama, we have to say only this much that if there is a principle that a Sanskrit dramatist cannot violate, it is this principle. Sanskrit dramatist aims at presenting a basic mental state in such a manner as to bring about the identification of the aesthete with the focus of the situation so as to make him experience the emotion of the hero. He, therefore, cannot introduce any action, which is not in harmony with the basic mental state.

Unity of action in Sanskrit Drama is both *subjective* and *objective*. It is subjective in so far as the whole series of actions springs from a single subjective principle, the basic emotion. It is objective in so far as the series of actions is logically related to a single end. The Sanskrit conception of unity of action presents an advance on Greek and English conceptions. For the latter recognise objective unity only.

Analysis of the Main Plot

Any action, if conceived of as complete, has five parts— (i) Before any action, that is to lead to any considerable achievement, is actually begun, there has to be clear consciousness of what is intended to be achieved, eagerness and determination to get it and decision as regards the ways and means of attainment. (ii) Once the action is planned out, the next stage will naturally be the actual beginning of the execution of the plan. (iii) This will naturally give rise to some hope of attaining the wished for. These three stages are common to every action, whether it is going to be a failure or a success. (iv) After this stage there arises the difference between the tragic and the commic or non-tragic action. In the former case the ambitious reaches as near his goal as he ever can and then he meets some such obstacle or hindrance as he can never get over and, therefore,

begins to recede from it. This can be represented to be the fourth stage of action. (v) And then he meets his doom. But in the comic or non-tragic action, though undoubtedly the pursuant of his goal meets difficulties, but they are not such as he cannot overcome; or, such are his inner and outer resources that he gets over all of them and becomes certain to achieve the objective. The final stage is naturally the realisation of what he had set his heart on.

In a good drama, which has to present action as a unity, and the action of which has to be complete in itself, these five stages are clearly distinguishable. In all Shakespearean dramas all these stages of action are clearly distinguishable. In fact each of the five acts of a drama is intended to present one of the five stages of action. It is interesting to note in this connection that this is just the basis of division of the main plot into acts (Aṅkas) in Sanskrit drama. And a good drama (Nāṭaka) can never have less than five acts. When there are more than five acts, the additional acts present some one or the other of these five stages, which could not be well presented in one act. But more than two acts can never be occupied with the presentation of the same stage. It is because of this that the number of acts in a drama can never exceed ten.[7]

These stages in the case of a comedy in English are generally called (i) cause, (ii) growth, (iii) height, (iv) consequence and (v) close. In the case of a tragedy, however, the last two are differently called, because of the difference in the turn that action takes. They are called (i) fall, because it represents the fall from the height which is reached by the hero; and (ii) catastrophe, because herein he meets his doom. In Sanskrit also they are called by words which have almost the same implication as the first five,

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[7] *D. R.* 7.

mentioned above. They are—(i) Ārambha, (ii) Yatna, (iii) Praptyāśā (iv) Niyatāpti and (v) Phalāgama.[8]

Comparing the division of action into different stages by Bharata and Aristotle, we find that while Bharata divides action into five stages, Aristotle does so into three. But Aristotle's subdivision of the middle is such as includes additional stages admitted by Bharata and English dramaturgists.

(i) There is perfect agreement between Bharata and Aristotle in the conception of the first stage. Both give it names which imply the same thing. One calls it *Prārambha*. The other calls it beginning. (ii) The middle is subdivided by Aristotle into (1) complication, (2) resolution, (3) revolution and (4) discovery. The last two are implied in resolution. In Sanskrit we have three parts of the middle—(i) Yatna, the use of the chosen means by the hero, or some one closely connected with him, for the attainment of the desired end. Aristotle has nothing corresponding to it. Of course complication presupposes it. (ii) Prāptyāśā corresponds to Aristotelian conception of complication inasmuch as it involves ignorance of some particulars on the part of hero; it implies that there is a cover which shrouds certain facts; it implies reversal in fortune of the principal character. (iii) Niyatāpti corresponds to resolution or disentanglement. For, it is concerned with the removal of shroud, clearing of mystery, as a result of which the hero becomes certain to realise his objective.

This is, however, to be noted here that there is nothing in Sanskrit, corresponding to fall and catastrophe in English tragedy, because in Sanskrit we have no tragedy in the strict sense of it in English. We have already explained why we have no tragedy in Sanskrit.

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[8] *D*, R. 5.

Thus though Sanskrit drama differs from both English and Greek dramas, particularly tragedies, in respect of the object that it presents and the effect that it aims at producing in the spectator, yet there is fair similarity in the treatment of the subject matter and the technique adopted for it.

WHITEHEAD AND SANKARA

By P. Nagaraja Rao

(*Continued from Vol. V Pt.* 4)

It is a reciprocal superimposition. When the body is ill or well one says I am ill or well, when it lacks the sense of sight or hearing, one says, I am blind or I am deaf. We too well know that the senses belong to the category of the not-self, as any piece of external matter. In spite of the diametrically opposing characteristics we still identify the one with the other. It is further argued with great cogency and persuasive skill that unless there is superimposition on the ātman of the anātman, it is not possible to have knowledge or *vyavahāra*. Unless one identifies himself with his sense organs, one cannot become the knowing subject. The subject-object relation presupposed in knowledge implies and necessitates the assumption of māyā. Thus Śaṅkara points out that in everything we need māyā. Even the effort to transcend māyā has to be made in the world of māyā.[83]

An adequate description of māyā in terms of finite categories, the advaitin has not been able to give us. He holds that māyā is not real because it is destroyed at the time of Brahman realisation. It is not unreal because we cognise it. So it is difficult to brand it as unreal and relegate it to the category of the barren woman's son and horns of a hare.

It cannot be described as the Real and the unreal, for such a description violates the Law of contradiction. Nor can it be described as non-real-cum-non-unreal, because it is of a positive nature. For want of any description the

[83] Śaṅkara's commentary on *Vedānta sūtra*. *Adhyāsa bhāṣya*.

advaitin describes it as indeterminable or *anirvacanīya*. It may be urged against the advaitin that his concept of māyā is not intelligible. He admits it and says, why expect perfect intelligibility from what is itself called avidyā? Practical efficiency belongs to māyā and māyā alone and not to Brahman. The advaitin's metaphysics is like that of Kant, critical. He finds the accepted canons of logic and the categories of thought self-contradictory and discrepant. The ultimate truth which the advaitin accepts rests on intuitive realisation. There is always an unexplained element in all theories. The doctrine of māyā does not recklessly accept any and every position, nor does it dogmatise about anything. It examines every category and tenet and shows up the inner contradictions. The term māyā expresses the limitation of human knowledge. Finite knowledge is possible only in limits, our understanding is hedged in by limitations and when we cross the fence we are not able to describe. The English Absolutist Bradley tells us, that 'to show how and why the universe is, so that finite existence belongs to it, is utterly impossible. That would imply an understanding of the whole, not practicable for a mere part'.

Whitehead makes a few observations on this aspect. He says, 'the certainties of science are a delusion. They are hedged around with unexplored limitations'......... 'Our handling of scientific doctrines is controlled by the diffused metaphysical concepts of our epoch. Even so, we are continually led into errors of expectation. Also, whenever some new mode of observational experience is obtained the old doctrines crumble into a fog of inaccuracies'.[84] After a few pages he again points out 'but for all these differences, human thought is now endeavouring to express analogous elements in the composition of nature. It only dimly discerns, it misdescribes, and it wrongly associates'.[85]

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[84] *Adventures of Ideas* p. 198.
[85] *Ibid*. p. 203.

Thus there is always the difficulty to get a fully explained universe.

The indeterminable nature of māyā in terms of finite categories should not lead us to the conclusion that the advaitin is a sceptic and an agnostic. Here, unlike Bradley, Śaṅkara does affirm the reality of the spirit. Though it is not knowable, it can be realised by intuition. It is the reality behind all the things. 'Scepticism,' Bradley describes as follows 'I mean by scepticism the mere denial of any known satisfactory doctrine, together with the personal despair of any future attainment'.[86]

There is no such despair in Śaṅkara. Brahman is the only real existent. It is the reality of the appearance. The world is not a pure conceptual construct but an objective entity. In the words of an independent advaita thinker the world is not a *dṛṣṭi-ṣṛṣṭi* but *anābhāsa*. He explains the term *ābhāsa* as *avicārita saṃsiddhi*, i.e. that which is established till the final realisation.[87]

The term appearance is not a libel. In a celebrated passage Bradley brings out the significance of appearance. 'That the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movements of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories."[88]

So far we have seen how Whitehead's definition of religious experience fits in with the advaita metaphysics. Brahman is something which stands beyond, behind and within the flux of immediate things. 'We have also seen how Brahman is related to the immediate flux of things'.

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[86] Bradley *Essays in Truth and Reality*; p. 445.

[87] Sūreśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārttika*.

[88] Bradley *Principle of logic*: Vol II p. 591 (1922).

Further the religious experience is declared to be[6] something which is real, yet waiting to be realised, something which is a remote possibility and yet the greatest of present facts.[89]

This idea is integral to the advaita conception of release or mokṣa.

In its conception of mokṣa the advaita view scores over other systems. Most of the theistic systems describe mokṣa as attained by the grace of the Lord. In the language of the theistic passages of the Upaniṣads, mokṣa is represented as due to Īśvara's grace (prasāda). It is derivative. Man's virtue and ethical life prepare him for the liberation. There is a gulf between man and God, between Time and Eternity. The difference is a difference in kind and not of degree. Liberation is a supernatural gift of the Lord to the aspiring spiritual aspirant. It is not native to the soul of man. Man has essentially creaturliness. He can never become liberated from finitude except through Lord's grace.[90]

Such a position is not acceptable to Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara posits that mokṣa is native to man and not derivative. Man and Brahman are not two different kinds of entities. One can evolve into another. Evolution in the inorganic field and in the animal world is automatic and is guided by natural laws. Even in the world of nature modern Biologists are of opinion that there are no burlesque mutations. Julian Huxley in his recent volume of collected essays says 'With the new knowledge of the last twenty years the overwhelming consensus of biology has returned to support Darwin's original view of extreme gradualness of all evolutionary change.[91]

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[89] *Science and the Modern world* : p. 238.

[90] Theistic Christianity and all the theistic schools of Vedānta hold to this view.

According to Rāmānuja the *Gītā* is the book of devotion demanding self-surrender to the Lord's will.

[91] Julian Huxley. *On living in a Revolution*, p. 47. (1944).

Even a sceptical historian like Gibbon writes as follows, 'I shall not, I trust, be accused of superstition, but I must remark, that even in this world, the natural order of events will some times afford the strong appearance of moral retribution.'

But evolution at the human level is not physical. The process becomes conscious. Man has reached his biomechanical limit. Development can take place only on the side of values, and not in physical power. Julian Huxley observes that with man evolution takes a different turn, with him values and ideals come into being. The criteria is their satisfaction. 'The quest for truth and knowledge, virtue, beauty and aesthetic expression and its satisfaction through the channels of science and philosophy, mysticism and morality, literature and arts, becomes one of the modes or avenues of evolutionary progress. A tendency in this direction had been manifested earlier in evolution. On the whole, biological progress in its later stages had been more concerned with independence of the environment than with control over it.....We may anticipate that in the remote future that human control over the environment will become increasingly devoted to securing greater independence—in other words, greater freedom from material exigencies—and both of them together to securing a greater degree of self-realisation and of the satisfaction of the human values'[92].

Aristotle observed 'that without virtue man is the most dangerous animal.' But his high destiny is not the gift of any supernatural entity but can be had by his own effort. The Gitā says 'let a man raise the self by the self and not let the self become depressed, for, verily, is the self the friend of the self and also the self the self's enemy.'[93]

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[92] *Ibid* p. 52.
See : *Hibbert Journal Julian Huxley 'Philosophy in a World at War'* Nov. 1942.

[93] *Gītā* VI-5.

F. 6

The Buddha asked his disciples to take their refuge in the self. 'Be ye, as those who have the self as their light, Be ye, as those who have the self as their refuge.' Betake yourself to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as to a refuge.[94]

The charter of advaita says 'that thou art' and not 'that thou wilt become.' Brahman realisation is not something that is produced but it is there all the time waiting to be realised. It is the art of self discovery.[95]

The illustration given is that of a prince brought up as hunter from infancy, discovering afterwards that he is of royal blood.[96] In the words of Vidyāraṇya, it is like the laying of ones hand on a forgotten golden ornament which is all the time resting on one's own neck:. Śaṅkara proclaims that which is produced is bound to be destroyed. He holds that it is not produced. 'It is present, because it is eternal and is not dependent on the effort of human beings.'[97] It is real, but not realised. It is a making known and not a bringing into being. The kingdom of heaven comes not by observation. It is not hither nor thither, but is within us. It is the birth right of man. It is real; if it comes into being it cannot be real. 'That which is

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[94] *Mahaparinibbuna sutta.* 33.

[95] The English poet Robert Browning gives expression to the advaita concept of mokṣa in the following lines, *Paracelsus*.

' Truth lies within ourselves ; it takes no rise.
From outward things, whate'ver you may believe,
There is an inmost centre in us all
Where Truth abides in fullness ; and to know
Rather consists in opening a way,
When the imprisoned splendour may escape
Than in effecting entry for a light,
Supposed to be without.'

[96] Śaṅkara on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II, 1, 1.

[97] Śaṅkara on *Vedānta sūtra* 1, 1, 1.
'Bhûtam brahma jijñāsyam.

eternal cannot be achieved by action.[98] As the *Gītā* puts it 'the unreal never is, the real never is not.'[99]

The *Chāndogya* declares 'that all beings visit Brahman world, day after day but not one realises it.'[100] If Brahman is so near us and if its realisation does not involve an ecstatic flight to some distant land, why do people not take advantage of it ? Spinoza has answered the question for us, 'If the way of salvation lay ready to hand and could be found without toil, would it be neglected by nearly every one.' His answer is, 'all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.'[101]

The Upaniṣads do not minimise the difficulty involved in the attainment of release. Śankara holds the view that the direct instrument for mokṣa is jñāna. Ethical excellence and ceremonial purity are only aids to jñāna. By jñāna we mean realisation and not mediate knowledge. Mere mediate knowledge does not take us very far.[02] The sage Nārada approached Sanatkumāra for instruction in that art which would give him freedom and abiding peace. He confessed to Sanatkumāra that he was learned in all the arts. He said, I know the *Ṛgveda* the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāma-veda*, the *Atharvaveda* as the fourth legend and ancient lore (itihāsa-purāṇa) as the fifth, veda of the vedas i.e., Grammar etc............He concluded saying that he was only the knower of *mantras* and not *ātman*.[103] Brahman realised is not through intellectual process. It is a type of illumination. For Brahman reali-

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[98] *Muṇḍaka* II, 12 'nastyakṛtaḥ kṛtena'

[99] *Gītā* II 16.

[100] *Chāndogya*, VIII, 2.

[101] Spinoza *Ethics* concluding passage.

[102] *Varāhopaniṣad*—
asti brahmeti ced parokṣajñānam eva tat
aham brahmeti ced veda sākṣātkāras sa ucyate.

[103] *Chandogya*, VII, 1, 3.

sation intellectuality paves the way, ceremonial purity (karma) and ethical excellence lead to the purification of the mind. On the intellectual side the training consists of the study and discussion of the Upaniṣads with the help of a guru who has some experience of spiritual-life. The study must enable us to meditate upon self. It must give us that knowledge which destroys māyā which is the cause of all sufferings. We must also understand that the prime purport of all scriptures is the identity of the ātman with self. The intellectual discipline must enable us to discriminate between the eternal and the transient. At the intellectual stage it must be of the nature of a conviction. *Sravaṇa* i.e., the study of scripture gives us this knowledge. The second stage is called *manana* i.e. arguing within oneself as to how and why the vedantic teaching alone is true. In this stage, what has been learnt from others is turned into a conviction, Rational reflection has a very important place in advaita.[104]

After reflection we have *nididhyāsana*. It is a continued and prolonged meditation of the advaitic truth till the time of realisation. If this is not done, the conviction will peter away by the unconscious reassertion of old habits of thought and desires. It is here we feel the need to check our impulses and train them well. Śaṅkara is not for the thwarting of our desires, but is for training them and harnessing them to proper ends. That is the purpose of morality. A mere natural life is not likely to lead man to realisation. The unregenerate life of man must be overcome. This can be achieved by a healthy kind of disinterestedness as advocated by the *Gītā*. The central point of the *Gītā* is that a certain amount of renunciation is necessary and good in every act for its being done well.[105] In the words of A. Huxley 'disinterestedness helps us to break our unregenerate self-hood.

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[104] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II, 4, 5.

[105] This is the stand taken by Mahatma Gandhi in his commentary on the *Gītā*. He appropriately calls it *anāsakti yoga*.

It is this self-hood that constitutes the most heavy and hardly translucent substance which cuts off most of the light of Reality and distorts what little it permits to pass. Śaṅkara enumerates the necessity for the practice of six virtues;[106] the control of the mind and the senses. These two lead to the temperance of thought. Temperance of act i.e. *Uparati* leads to renunciation in fact. The next one is fortitude. It is courage to endure the opposits. The last two are powers of concentration and faith (samādhānam and śraddhā). This gives us necessary strength to realise Brahman,. The moral training coupled with intellectual knowledge makes the aspirant desire liberation.

After a strenuous moral training as the *Gītā* puts it, the individual has to abstract his senses from the multiplicity of objects. Further he has to put down firm by the surging and distracting desires that trouble the mind. A highly concentrated self can hear the inner voice. The *Gītā* asks us to be *ekākī* and *have yatacitta*'.[107] It is only after this that realisation follows, when the individual gets behind the real self and goes down in the deep he establishes contact with the primary reality that is called *sākṣātkāra* or spiritual experience.

Now we have seen how spiritual realisation is the greatest of present facts and yet it is a remote possibility. The self is covered with many layers. The function of knowledge is to unveil the deepest layers of man's being and get into enduring contact with it. It is an experience and not a mere knowledge. It is an act of awareness. The important point about Śaṅkara is that mokṣa is not a supper-natural gift but a natural evolution. It is not through devine election, but through natural evolution that man attains

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106 Huxley *Grey eminence*. p. 55.

107 *Gītā*. VI—10.

108 Śaṅkara 'anubhavārūḍham eva ca vidyāphalam.' on *Vedānta sūtra*: III, 4, 15.

mokṣa. It is by the concentrated effort of man's entire self, illumined by knowledge that he attains release. The son of man becomes God; through the crucifixion we have the resurrection.

The nature of mokṣa though it is in the very nature of man is most difficult to attain because of man's selfish nature. The *Gītā* says[6] 'amongst thousands of men scarcely one strives for perfection, and of those who strive and succeed scarcely one knows the truth.'[109] In our activities we must try to be godlike. Aristotle observed, 'It is right that though we are mortal we should seek as far as possible to live as though we were immortal.'[110]

The third part in the definition of religious experience describes it 'as something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.'[111]

The advaitin describes Brahman realisation as the supreme object of human life. It is held that it is the biggest thing in the world. Sanatkumāra instructs Nārada that what is great is bliss, there is no bliss in the small. (Yo vai bhūmā tat sukham nālpe sukham asti, bhūmaiva sukham.) It is held as the supreme value of life. Lord Kṛṣṇa says 'that on gaining which one feels there is no greater gain.'[112] Sage Āpastamba observes 'there is no greater gain than the true awareness of self.'[113] 'Seek ye first the kingdom of heaven all other things will be added unto you.' That is the strain in which the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara speak about the significance and value of realisation.

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[109] *Gītā*, VII. 3.
[110] S. Radhakrishnan, *India and China* p. 66.
[111] *Science and the Modern world* : p. 238.
[112] *Gītā* VI, 22.
[113] *Āpastamba sūtra* : 1, 22.

It is Brahman realisation that gives meaning to all that passes. Without it, it has no significance. All the things of the world are for it.

In a celebrated dialogue Yājñavalkya instructs his wife in the art of self-realisation and its significance. The spiritual aspirant Maitreyī when confronted by the separation of her husband and the bestowal of his goods put the question, 'If now, sir, this whole earth filled with wealth were mine, would I be immortal thereby?' 'No,' said Yājñāvalkya, 'as the life of the rich, even so would your life be; of immortality, however, there is no hope through wealth.'[114]

Then said Maitreyī 'what should I do with that, through which I may not be immortal?'[115] It is after this question that Yājñavalkya instructs her. He points out in his discourse that all our love is not merely for the object which we say we love; be it the son, the wife or the husband. It is the love of the self that makes us love things. He concludes 'verily, not for love of all is all dear, but for love of the soul all is dear.'[116] What does it profit a man, as Christ put it, 'if he gains the whole world and loses his self.' The love of humanity and many things in this world is possible because of the love of self. The German Vedāntin Dr. Deussen towards the end of his tour in India said in a gathering in Bombay that the gospels quite correctly establish as the highest morality 'love your neighbour as yourself.' But why should I do so since by the order of nature I feel pleasure and pain only in myself, not in my neighbour. The answer is not in the Bible, but it is in the Upaniṣads, in the great formula *tattvamasi*. You love your neighbour as yourself because you are your neighbour. The ātmā is sarvasya ātma (it is the soul of all souls).

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[114] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* : II, 4, 2.
[115] *Ibid* II, 4, 3.
[116] *Ibid* II, 4, 5.

Advaita metaphysics holds the view that all the bits of pleasures we get from our contact with the objects of the world are due to the Reality behind it which is consciousness, bliss and 'infinitude.'

Again, Yājñavalkya instructs his royal pupil the philosopher king of India Janaka 'that on a part of just this (Brahman) bliss other creatures have their living.' (etas-yaivānandasya anyāni bhūtāni mātrāmupajīvanti). He adds 'this is the highest achievement. This is the highest world. This is the highest bliss.[117] It is this that gives meaning to all that is in the world of space and time. It is the final good and still it is very difficult for unregenerate men to attain it. As the *Gītā* puts, it, human imagination and life being incurably earth-bound, is limited to the human. As a consequence of it we confuse and overlay our souls with thick layers of unreality. We continuously live at the plane of unreality. So we do not reach outside the range of the worlds of sense and reason. We get nettled into the meshes of our reason and passions. We become giddy with the power of our wealth and scientific knowledge. We declare in the language of the *Gītā* 'I am the Lord of all (Īśvara) and I enjoy myself.I am prosperous and mighty.'[118]

This I have gained to day; and that longing I will fulfill. This wealth is mine, and that also shall be mine hereafter. 'This foe I have slain and others too I shall slay'. I am rich and of high birth, who is there like unto me.' While hugging such thoughts to his mind the wretched human forgets that the Lord might say 'Thou fool, this night shall thy soul be required of thee.'

If men continue to live at this level of unreality they do not see the light. The sense of unreality increases by what it feeds on. Men begin to live the life of the impulses.

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[117] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* IV, 3, 32.

[118] *Gītā* XVI. V. 14.

They don't check their impulses, or supress their wishes. They find no need to mortify their flesh. They live to the full capacity of their nature. They keep their faculties at the concert pitch. They live an all round life. Appolo gets his due, Venus also gets her due. This unregenerate life at the level of unreality has no chance of spiritual experience. It is a hopeless quest for them. They are never after it. If you tell them that 'blessed are those that hunger after spiritual experience' they reply, we have no appetite for that excellent fare. Lord Kṛṣṇa refers to them as the lost souls. He says, these unregenerate souls 'being deluded from birth to birth never attain me.'[120] The quest is hopeless for these men and it eludes their apprehension. 'Many are called but few are chosen.' The few must choose themselves.

The Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara both insist on a discriminative wisdom as the cause of philosophic enquiry and hold the view that detachment is necessary for it. The *Kaṭha* declares that the path of self realisation is 'like the sharp edge of a razor difficult to cross and hard to tread.'[121] It warns us to be wide awake and not allow the devil to take possession of us. We must be sentinels forever on guard against the strategems of the enemy. The devil has a hundred hide-outs from which it will be springing up. Eternal vigilance is the price not only of political liberty but of spiritual realisation. Good life is indispensable to it. If spiritual realisation is non-derivative and so easy, why do men not take to it? It gives them eternal bliss. The answer is then men are doped in their fancy happiness. So they continue to live at the level of unreality. The awakening is necessary. It is obtained by critical enquiry and realised by unremitting endeavour.

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[119] *Gītā*: XVI, V 13, 14, 15.

[120] *Gītā*: XVI. V, 20.

[121] *Kaṭha*: 1, III, 14.

We have seen so far what religious experience is and how it is the ultimate ideal and final good. In the language of the Upaniṣads, realisation frees us from fear and secures abhaya (freedom from fear). It ferries us across the ocean of sorrow. It gives us śānti. Man is created for this vision.

It is men with this experience that are able to reform the world. They do not have any longing whatsoever. They regard entire world as their home. They have no individual good to pursue. 'Considerations of mine and thine weigh only with the little minded; to the large hearted the whole world is a single house hold.'[122] They go about the universe scattering love on the pavements of the universe even though it is unrequited. In the words of S. Radhakrishnan these men are the creative spirits who disclose the reality of the spirit at vast interval of time through the power of their life and teaching. They have seen God face to face and reflect clearly the divine purpose and practice it. Their wisdom is enlightenment and their knowledge is power. They 'add to the invisible forces of goodness' in the world. They have 'stamped infinity' on the thought and the life of the country.

These seers after their spiritual realisation do not remain indifferent to the human situation and misery. The seer is not a mere spectator. The realised soul by his example and activity brings good to mankind. It is of these men of spiritual realisation, rapt in intimate union with Brahman, the ocean of infinite bliss and knowledge, the poet said, 'their family is for ever sanctified, their mothers blessed. They are the peace-makers and the salt of the earth.'[123]

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[122] ayaṁ nijaḥ paro veti gaṇanā laghucetasāṁ : udāracaritānāṁ tu vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam.

[123] Kulaṁ pavitraṁ, jananī kṛtārthā, vasundharā puṇyavatī ca tena, Apāra saṁvit sukhasāgare' smin līnam pare brahmaṇi'yasya cetaḥ.

Peace or śānti is the main characteristic of realisation. It is one ineffable joy. As the Upaniṣad puts it, fear arises only from the existence of a second.

We have so far examined Whitehead's celebrated definition of religion and the advaitin's concept. We have also noted how the description of religious experience is integral to advaita metaphysics. Whitehead agrees with the advaitin in affirming the importance of the concept of peace. He describes it at great length and holds the view that it alone completes civilisation. He says 'a society is to be termed civilised whose members participate in the five qualities—Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, Peace.'[125] It is peace 'which shall bind together the other four qualities, so as to exclude from our notion of civilisation the restless egotism with which they have often in fact been pursued.'[126] 'Apart from it (peace),' Whitehead holds, the pursuit of 'Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art' can be ruthless, hard, cruel.' [127] He does not equate peace with 'tenderness' and 'love.' He does not think it is impersonal. He says that 'impersonality is too dead a notion and 'tenderness' too narrow.'

He describes peace as follows, 'The peace that is here meant is not the negative conception of anaesthesia. It is a positive feeling which crowns the 'life and motion' of the soul. It is hard to define and difficult to speak of. It is not a hope for the future, nor is it an interest in present details. It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalised and yet momentous in its coordination of values. Its first effect is the removal of the stress of acquisitive feeling arising from the soul's preoccupation with itself. Thus peace

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124 dvitīyād vai bhayam bhavati.
125 *Adventures of Ideas* : p. 367.
126 *Ibid* p. 367.
127 *Ibid* p. 366.

carries with it a surpassing of personality. There is an inversion of relative values.'[128]

He continues 'Its (peace) emotional effect is the subsidence of turbulence which inhibits. More accurately, it preserves the springs of energy, and at the same time masters them for the avoidance of paralysing distractions.'[129]

'The experience of peace is largely beyond the control of purpose. It comes as a gift. The deliberate aim at peace very easily passes into its bastard substitute, Anaesthesia. In other words, in the place of a quality of 'life and motion', there is substituted their destruction. Thus peace is the removal of inhibition and not its introduction. It results in a wider sweep of conscious interest. It enlarges the field of attention "[130]

'It is a barrier against narrowness. One of its fruits is that passion whose existence Home denied, the love of mankind as such.'[131]

Whitehead further holds the view 'that there can be no real halt of civilisation in the indefinite repetition of a perfected ideal. Staleness sets in. And this fatigue is nothing other than the creeping growth of anesthesia, whereby that social group is gradually sinking towards nothingness'[132]

Decay, transition, loss, displacement belong to the essence of the creative advance...[133] It keeps vivid the sensitiveness to the tragedy; and it sees the tragedy as a living agent persuading the world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact. Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal what might have been, and was not'.[134]

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[128] *Adventures of Ideas* : p. 367.
[129] *Ibid* p. 367.
[130] *Ibid* p. 368.
[131] *Adventures of Ideas* : p. 368.
[132] *Ibid* ; p. 368.
[133] *Ibid* : p. 368-369.
[134] *Ibid* : p. 369.

Whitehead's description of peace and that of the advaitin are similar to some extent. The points of agreement are as important as the points of difference. Peace (śānti) is the final description of realisation. It is not negative, nor an unconscious state of mind. It is plenitude itself. It is bliss, knowledge and consciousness. Peace is declared to be the absolute requisite of well being. The *Gītā* declares 'he that has no peace—whence has he happiness.'[135] The sense of śānti born of spiritual realisation makes one realise the universal nature of self. He desires the good of all (sarvabhūtahite rataḥ). He has not egoistic feeling, he sees every where the universal self. The realisaton of peace is the chief characteristic of spiritual experience. Śaṅkara regards it as native to the soul, which requires only to be unfolded. It is not a gift, not a present from above. The man who has realised peace goes above the relative distinctions of morality which obtains in the world of duality. He is no longer troubled by external standards. He is a law unto himself. As Burns observed 'the little men need rules and nothing else, the great men are a law unto themselves. He has no conflict. He no longer worries in the words of the Upaniṣads'. Have I done aught that is sinful, or neglected aught that is good.'[136]

The man of peace has a universal vision. Some enlightened Christian missionaries and fanatical theists criticise the ethics of the perfection of self-realisation as non-moral because it does not admit of the distinction of the good and the evil. The state of spiritual perfection is no doubt beyond the region of good and evil.

But that is not an invitation to practise unethical conduct The man of spiritual life has all his egoistic and acquisitive feeling burnt away. They are the chief sources of bad

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[135] *Gītā* : II, 66.

[136] *Taittirīya* : II, 9.

conduct. With them all evil goes. Nothing bad can result from him. He has the source of all evil destroyed in him. He has no separatist feeling which is the basis of all distinctions and preferences. The strain of choosing the right and wrong and living the right ethical life is confined to the world of plurality. The advaitin envisages a stage beyond this. Spiritual experience transmutes conduct to that stage. After this experience the individual loses his self consciousness. He has no 'I'ness (mamatā). It is only when we are self conscious that our love to others is particularistic and not universal. The love which an individual bestows on others is exclusive. At this stage he loves with some strain. The law of love is still external to him. He has feelings of self-approbation and self-condemnation. The strain of ethical life is still present before him. As a result of spiritual realisation he transcends this dual point of view and relative distinctions. The selflessness or the unselfishness of the realised soul is the perfect one. The unselfishness of the soul that is conscious of its unselfishness is not the highest. It is moral but not spiritually perfect. We must forget the self-conscious nature of the moral agent also to be perfect. The *Mahābhārata* puts it well.

It asks us first to 'forswear all selfishness and then forswear that by which we do.'[137] At this stage law and love become one. It is only men with such realisation that can say 'There can be no happiness for any of us, until it is won for all?' 'If blood is to be shed, let it be ours,'

They exhort us to cultivate the quiet courage of dying without killing. Thus we see the ethic of self perfection is supra moral.

[137] *Mahābhārata* : XII 337-40
tyaja dharmam adharmam ca, ubhe satyânṛte tyaja
ubhe satyānṛte tyaktvā yena tyajati tat tyaja.

[138] Mahatma Gandhi. 'For man lives freely only by his readiness to die it needs it be at the hands of his brother, never by killing him'.

The metaphysical presupposition of Whitehead's system in responsible for the differences between his concept of peace and that of Śankara. Whitehead conceives peace in terms of a dynamic process and not a static realisation. It is consistent with his conception of reality as a process. He holds that 'there is not the indifinite repetition of a perfect ideal.' He inveighs against the conception of the ideal of static perfection. He holds that there is room for indefinite progress and continuous emergence of novelty. 'Decay transition, loss, and displacement belong to the essence of creative advance.' Śaṅkara does not agree with such an ideal. The advaitin distinguishes between progress and perfection. The temporal order of events is not the fundamental character of reality. Time is not an ultimate philosophical category for Śaṅkara as in Whitehead. For Whitehead there is nothing beyond the historical process. Evolution for him takes place and develops in the historical process through the interactions of several factors. The advaitin does not equate progress and perfection, time and eternity. The difference between them is not only a matter of degree. The two are two different dimensions. Perfection is not completed progress, nor eternity mere everlasting time. Progress with its corollary is confined according to the advaitin to the phenomenal world. Progress belongs to the historical and temporal process. The purpose of history and man is not completely realised in the historical process and temporal order. Perfection refers to the ultimate ideal of man. It is eternal and not everlasting. 'Time is real only as the vehicle of values. Values abide and things endure.' Spinoza following such a line of thought identifies perfection with Reality. He said 'by reality and perfection, I mean one and the same thing.'

Things change in this world of ours. Progress and regress are the characters we ascribe to them in the light

of some purposes. Progress as a concept is intelligibe only when viewed in the light of purposes. Purposes are manifold, and they differ from men to men. The craze for the doctrine of progress is characteristic of some of our contemporary British philosophers. They in their anxiety to be ever on the move have set their gods also on the motion.

As a result of it we have evolving gods. Progress and perfection do not belong to the same level of experience. Time and eternity are different levels. Radhakrishnan observes that perfection is not attained within the time order or within the limits of the historical process. 'It is victory over time, a triumphant passage from the historical to the super historical.'[139] Perfection, Śaṅkara describes as the means by which one 'arrives at a goal without travelling.'[140] It is a change of out-look.[141] It is in short a transcendental state. It has no change or progress. It is perfection itself.

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139 *Philosophy*: 1937 p. 264.

140 'anadhvagāḥ adhvasu pārayiṣṇavaḥ'.

141 'avagatireva gatiḥ.'

SOME OF THE OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THE ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY ACCORDING TO SUREŚWARA*

By VEERAMANI PRASAD UPADHYAYA

INDIA has produced many systems of philosophy and even one system has been interpreted in several ways so as to give rise to numerous schools on the whole. Attempts have been made at presenting the fundamental doctrines of these systems in English by many European and Indian scholars, who with a gift for lucid expressions and admirable command over the language have succeeded in popularising the real spirit of the general phases of these philosophical thoughts. The advaita view, as enunciated by the illustrious founder of the school, namely, Śaṅkara, has been brought out in general and its importance among the various systems of Indian Philosophy also has been envisaged and emphasised. But it remains still an unful-filled task to set forth the salient features of differences, worked out by the subsequent interpretors and followers of Śaṅkara. Without the valuable works of his disciples and followers, who expounded his thought in various ways, the advaita system would not have occupied the important place, which it does now.

It is a matter of supreme satisfaction that in the recent years a large and increasing improvement has been manifested in the general taste of the reading public and interested scholars for the advaita system of philosophy, which is responsible for new expositive works constantly pouring out in the field. It is universally admitted that the mass of the advaita literature grew rapidly and enormously in the Post-Śaṅkara period as a result of keen competitions

* This is a portion from the D. Litt. Thesis of the author on Sureśwara.

going on between different schools of Vedānta and of controversies tenaciously carried on by their staunch adherants by way of charges and counter-charges. It is no doubt a fact that for those, chiefly interested in philosophical thoughts, argumentation or wordy warfare has no great value and what is of supreme importance is the principal tenets of the system. Nevertheless, the enormous works of the Post-Śaṅkara period, belonging to the said kind of literature, cannot be ignored; since in them are embedded the developments and the interesting interpretations of the underlying principles of the advaita system. Sundry minor metaphysical controversies, which once intensely agitated the keenest intellects, may now possess only a historical interest for the superficial readers. But to bring the individual doctrines and differences of views, wrapped up in them, into proper light is the need of the day, as the general tenets and broad outlook of the advaita sysytem have already been brought out and lucidly presented in English by eminent scholars. So what we more particularly need at present is an authorwise specialisation in the works of the prominent Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. An attempt in this direction, that is, at the presentation of the philosophy of advaita with special reference to any one or more of the Post-Śaṅkara advaitins has been already started by Dr. Asutosh Sāstri and Dr. T.M.P. Mahādevan.

The above-named writers, however, have made an exposition of the advaita doctrines as developed and expounded by writers of much later period among Post-Śaṅkara advaitins. But nothing critically valuable has been done so far about the immediate successors of Śaṅkara, who are traditionally accepted to be his direct disciples and exponents of different schools of interpretations obtaining in the realm of advaitism. There is a yawning gulf between Śaṅkara and his direct disciples on the one hand and the

great names in the history of advaita, such as Vidyāraṇya,[1] Madhusūdana Saraswatī,[2] Citsukhācārya[3] and others. So an exposition of the advaita philosophy as understood and interpreted by Śaṅkara's direct successors remains an unexplored field. Of all his direct disciples, traditionally admitted to be so, Sureśvara figures as the most prominent, and he has also left behind a number of works, which, furni-

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[1] His works are :—

(1) विवरणप्रमेयसङ्ग्रह, (2) सूतसंहिताटीका, (3) पञ्चदशी, (4) अनुभूतिप्रकाश, (5) अपरोक्षानुभूति-टीका, (6) जीवन्मुक्तिविवेक, (7) ऐतरेयोपनिषद्दीपिका, (8) तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्दीपिका, (9) छान्दोग्योपनिषद्दीपिका, (10) बृहदारण्यकवार्त्तिकसार and (11) शङ्करदिग्विजय.

[2] His works are :—

सिद्धान्तविन्दु, (2) संक्षेपशारीरक-व्याख्या, (3) अद्वैतसिद्धि, (4) अद्वैतरत्नरक्षण, (5) वेदान्तकल्पलतिका, (6) गूढार्थदीपिका and (7) शिवमहिम्नःस्तोत्रटीका.

[3] (*a*) सर्वज्ञात्ममुनि—संक्षेपशारीरक A. IV, V. 62.

(*b*) प्रकाशात्ममुनि— P. P. V. (views quoted without directly referring to his name).

(*c*) आनन्दबोध—N. M.—P. 333 and P. 357.

(*d*) विमुक्तात्मा —I. S.—P. 255. and pp. 374—75.

(*e*) अमलानन्द —Kalpataru—P. 921.

(*f*) चित्सुखाचार्य—T. P.—Ps. 9, 112, 346, 348, 381 and 383.

(*g*) विद्यारण्य—V. P. S.—Ps. 31, 75, 114 and 205 Pañcadaśī VIII-12.

(*h*) अप्पय्यदीक्षित—S. C.—Ps. 407, 418, 473, 374 and 89 (without referring to his name).

(*i*) मधुसूदनसरस्वती—A. S.—Ps. 469, 483, 495, 515, 558, 696 and 885 ; S. B.—Ps. 220, 222, 255, 340 and 350 etc., V. K. *L*.—Ps. 12, 17, 25, 26, 27, 60, and 84.

(*j*) ब्रह्मानन्द—Laghu-candrikā-comm. on A. S., P. 483 ; N. R.—Ps., 221, 223, 259, 272, 273 nnd 343.

(*k*) रामाद्वय—वेदान्तकौमुदी (unpublished) and others.

shing sufficient data, provide enough scope for us to reconstruct a complete system of the philosophy in the light of his most substantial and valuable contributions to the advaita school. No doubt many of the special features of his views got almost shrouded in the subsequent over-whelming growth of the advaita literature, still his importance remains unquestionable when one takes into account the great progress effected by him in the advaita system through his marvellous interpretations and original contributions as the first exponent of the Ābhāsa theory. Although much of what may be treated as his original contributions may strike now as something not new and unfamiliar and mostly as common views of the advaitins by reason of their having been actually incorporated and frequently quoted in later works, yet it is an endeavour worth undertaking to examine critically all the works of Sureśvara and delineate the important aspects of the advaita philosophy as revealed through them by way of an exposition of the advaita system. This attempt will not only save the trouble of scholars, unavoidably entailed in wading through Suresvara's voluminous works in order to deduce his original views and contributions to the advaita system but will also secure an easy access to the secrets of the system, which have been here and there remarkably disclosed by Sureśvara in the course of his convincing and intelligent interpretation thereof.

Sureśvara occupies a very important place among those followers of Śaṅkara,who successfully tried to defend his system from the attacks of his opponents and expound the fundamental doctrines thereof in a very impressive and marvellous manner. His importance can be known by the fact that he is looked upon with great reverence by all the reputed advaitins of the Post-Śaṅkara period such as Madhusūdana Saraswatī Citsukhācārya, Vācaspati and

others, who themselves are regarded as master minds in advaita philosophy. The very fact that these writers quote him in their important works clearly establishes both the priority of Sureśvarācārya as well as the authoritativeness of his works.

Suresvarācārya is recognised as one of the original writers of advaita philosophy. He represents a special line of thought which is known as 'Ābhāsa-Vāda' followed by him in interpreting the essential doctrines of advaitism. That Sureśvara considered it to be his chief task to interpret, amplify and vindicate the thoughts of his Divine Master, Śaṅkara, is evident from his own verses.[4] When we call Sureśvara an original writer in the field of advaitic literature, we do not forget that he merely claims to interpret in his own way the thoughts of his predecessors in advaita philosophy. If one denies originality to Sureśvara on the score that he is a mere interpreter, he will have to deny the same even to Śaṅkara, for he too claims to formulate and represent systematically the Advaitic thoughts to be found in the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtras* No Hindu philosopher would venture to come at the sacrilege of presenting some truths as absolutely new and original, since every one necessarily traces his thoughts to the Vedas or Upaniṣadic passages and claims only to expose the valuable instructions and doctrines contained therein by interpreting them in a manner, suitable to his desired conclusions.

Suresvara is a voluminous writer and is credited with having left behind a large number of works, some of which are not available to us such as *Laghuvārtika* and *Vārtikasāra* etc. His important works, which are available and have

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[4] B. B. V.—pp. 2072-73, vv. 23-25 ; Sambandha-Vartika-P. I., V. 2 ; N. S.—A. I., P. 8, V. 5 ; A. IV, pp. 203-5 ; vv. 76-77 and 74.

formed the basic documents of the present thesis are the following:—

(1) *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika*,
(2) *Taittiriyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika*,
(3) *Pañcīkaraṇavārtika*,
(4) *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra-vārtika* called *Mānasollāsa* and
(5) *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*.

As the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika* the most prominent of all his works, is exceedingly voluminous and almost unmanageable, the present writer had to devote several years to the proper study and assimilation of the work. The main consideration, constantly looming large before his eyes in writing the present thesis, has been to elucidate and amplify the Ābhāsa-vāda, which is regarded as the original contribution of Sureśvarācārya and has not been analysed and explicated as yet by any modern writer on the advaita system.

The present writer also proposes to make an apology here that in weaving together the subtle threads of Sureśvara's views, lying scattered here and there in his works, he had sometimes to develop them in such a manner as might lead one to mis-understand what is mere exposition to be pure supplementation. But it may be pledged with the fullest conviction that nothing more than what could be actually and exactly gleaned from the thorough perusal of his entire works has been put forth as Sureśvara's views and original contributions throughout the whole of the thesis. The above-noted fact has also stood in the way of the proper documentation of the thesis, for mostly citations either prove too copious to be incorporated in the foot-notes or do not exactly bring out the intended conclusion, if wrested away from the whole work and studied separately as isolated and independent extracts. To quote is to dismember and the dismembered extracts mostly

do not serve the intended purpose. This much however, can be undoubtedly assured that the thesis is the net result and logical outcome of repeated studies and thorough assimilation of all the available works of Sureśvara, studied closely and analysed synthetically in such a way as to give rise to a consistent system of philosophical thoughts.

As regards the topics of the thesis, it may be remarked that the thesis contains almost all the elaborate explanations and new ideas, that may be culled from Sureśvara's works as his original and valuable contributions to the advaita system. The *Siddhānta-Leśa-saṅgraha* points out the following as the outstanding original views of Sureśvara :—

(1) The theory of Pratisaṅkhyā-Vidhi about Śravaṇa.

(2) The theory of "बाधायां सामानाधिकरण्यम्" about the interpretation of Mahāvākyas.

(3) Jīva is neither Pratibimba nor Avacchinna.

(4) The theory that Karma is necessary for Vividiṣā.

(5) The theory that all, belonging to the Dvija class, are entitled to Sannyāsa and Brahma-vidyā.

(6) The Upaniṣadic texts are the Kāraṇa of Brahma-realisation.

To the above may be added the following:—

(1) The theory of Sattaikya.

(2) The theory of Ābhāsa (establishing that all, other than the one Absolute Reality, Brahman, are explainable in the terms of Abhāsa).

(3) "Ātmātmavatva" is the relation of Avidyā and the universe to Brahman.

(4) The theory that Avidyā is one and undivided. though functionally diverse.

(5) The essential non-difference of Sākṣī, Antaryāmin and Iśvara.
(6) The different stages of the process of Cosmogenesis.
(7) The cognition subsequent to Suṣupti is a continuous experience and not a memory.
(8) The gradual stages of the path of perfection.
(9) The inscrutable and unlimited power of the word.
(10) Acceptance of "Jahat" Laksanā in the process of Akhaṇḍārtha-bodha about Brahman.
(11) The process of Akhaṇḍārtha-bodha.
(12) Avidyā-nivṛtti and Sansāra-nivṛtti are nothing but Brahman (on the general principle that an appearance is nothing but Reality unrealised and wrongly realised and the sublation thereof is nothing but Reality realised).

etc. etc.

Lastly, the present writer craves pardon for purposely refraining from the treatment of historical problems such as Maṇḍana-Sureśvara equation etc., as they fall outside the scope of the present thesis, which is mainly concerned only with the doctrinal side of the advaita philosophy as expounded by Suresvara. This much, however, may be unhesitatingly remarked and succinctly stated for the satisfation of readers that a perusal of the entire works of Sureśvara gives an indubious impression of Maṇḍana and Sureśvara being two distinct and prominent personalities in the field of the advaita literature, of the former being a somewhat predecessor to Śaṅkara and differing from him in views on many a topics of the advaita Vedānta and of the latter being his contemporary and disciple and a staunch follower and supporter of his views. With these preliminary remarks it is proposed now to give below some of the outstanding features of Advaitism as interpreted by Sureśvara.

(To be continued

GAUDAPĀDA'S KĀRIKĀ

By JNANENDRA LAL MAJUMDAR

(ALĀTAŚĀNTI)

(Continued from Vol. V. Pt. 4 p. 378)

XII. *To know Dharmadhātu in its purity is to know all*

कोट्य चतस्र एतास्तु ग्रहैर्यासां सदावृतः।
भगवानाभिरस्पृष्टो येन दृष्टः स सर्वदृक् ॥८४॥

Translation—(84) These are thus the four points by attachment to which the Bhagavān (Dharmadhātu) is always obscured. He by whom the Bhagavān is seen untouched by these, sees all.

Awakening of Faith. p. 58—"As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of, or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of, then you conform to Bhutatathata; and when your smriti (subjectivity) is thus completely obliterated, it is said to have the insight."

Ibid. p. 126—"All so-called illusory phenomena are in truth from the beginning what they are; and their essence is nothing but the one soul (or Mind). Though ignorant minds that cling to illusory objects cannot understand that all things are in their nature the highest reality (Paramartha), all Buddha-Tathagatas being free from clinging (or particularising) are able to have an insight into the true nature of things. And by virtue of their great wisdom they illuminate all distinctions between the defiled and the pure; through their immeasurable and inexhaustible sources of expediency (upayakausalya), which is good and excellent, they benefit

and gladden all beings according to the latters' various necessities and capabilities. Therefore, the mind that is saturated with subjectivity is annihilated, while all things are understood and omniscience (sarvakarajnana) is attained."

Ibid. p. 83—"We understand by the annihilation, not that of the Mind itself, but of its modes (only)."

Exposition:—

(84) From the above it will be amply clear how every form of discrimination is wrong from the stand-point of perfect knowledge. It is simply owing to our attachment to the false notions of discrimination about existence and non-existence that the true universal aspect of Dharmadhātu is obscured and in its place we see, or, rather, think that we see, the mirage of the world of discriminated particulars where our knowledge is necessarily limited. If ever, by strenuous spiritual effort, any one succeeds in dispelling the veil of discrimination and viewing the Dharmadhātu in its purity, then only his knowledge becomes unlimited and he knows what the entire world truly is, that it is the universal Dharmadhātu, where there is no idea of existence and non-existence , being or non-being oneness or bothness, eternality or annihilation.

प्राप्य सर्वज्ञतां कृत्स्नां ब्राह्मण्यं पदमव्ययम् ।
अनापन्नादिमध्यान्तं किमतः परमीहते ॥८५ ॥

Translation—(85) When he has attained universal omniscience, the non-dual state of Brahmahood, which has no beginning, middle or end, for what will he strive after this?

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, LXIV—"The (Mind as) norm is the abode of self-nature which has nothing to do with a world of causation; of this norm which is perfect existence and the highest Brahma, I speak."

Exposition :—

(85) Therefore Dharmadhātu is the true jñeya (knowable). Know it and you know all, and knowing all there is no more craving for knowledge. This omniscience is Brahmahood which is eternal and devoid of all touch with duality, for it is the true existence while duality is non-existent.

विप्राणां विनयो ह्येष शमः प्राकृत उच्यते।
दमः प्रकृतिदान्तत्वादेवं विद्वान् शमं व्रजेत् ॥८६॥

Translation—(86) This humility (i.e., absence of striving) on the part of wise men is said to be (their) natural tranquility (śama), and their discipline on account of the disciplining of (their) nature. Thus should a wise man attain tranquility.

XIII. *Buddha's teaching—Jñāna, Jñeya and Vijñeya*

(*a*) *Jñāna is of there kinds, of which Jñāna itself is transcendental*

सवस्तु सोपलम्भञ्च द्वयं लौकिकमिष्यते।
अवस्तु सोपलम्भञ्च शुद्धं लौकिकमिष्यते ॥८७॥
अवस्त्वनुपलम्भञ्च लोकोत्तरमिति स्मृतम्।
ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च विज्ञेयं सदा बुद्धैः प्रकीर्तितम् ॥८८॥

Translation—(87-88) The Buddhas have always taught (literally, declared) jñāna (knowledge), jñeya (object of jñāna or knowledge) and vijñeya (object of vijñāna or particularising knowledge). (Jñāna of) the duality with object and with perception is called super-worldly. (Jñāna) self without object and without perception is called transcendental.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, *LXVI*—"There are three kinds of Jnana—worldly, super-worldly and transcendental. Worldly knowledge belongs to the philosophers and to the ignorant and simple-minded who are attached to the dualistic

view of being and non-being. Super-worldly knowledge belongs to all the Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas who are attached to the notion of individuality and generality. Transcendental knowledge which is free from the dualism of being and non-being, belongs to the Bodhisattvas and takes its rise when they thoroughly examine things of imagelessness, see into the state of no-birth and no-annihilation and realise egolessness at the stage of Tathagatahood."

Ibid. *LXXI*—" When (we know that) there is knowledge gained independent of any supporting object, whatever statements we make about it are no more than thought-constructions."

Exposition:—

(86) When you have attained perfect knowledge and known Dharmadhātu and there is nothing else for you to know, your worldly nature of strife and restlessness has been subdued and perfect quiescence or peace has become your nature. It is towards this haven of peace that all wise men who are tired of the world wistfully turn their steps "to abide in the joy of existence" as the Buddha said. (*Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, *LXXXIX*.)

(87-88) Speaking of omniscience, we naturally come to the consideration of knowledge in general. These types of knowledge can be spoken of in respect of the three aspects in which things appear to ignorant and wise people, namely, knowledge of things which are *Parikalpita* or purely imaginary, knowledge of things which are *Paratantra* or mutually dependent, and knowledge of things considered as *Pariniṣpanna* or *Paramārtha*, the ultimate reality. Knowledge thus differentiated in accordance with the three svabhāvas or natures of things can again be differentiated in accordance with worldly, super-worldly and transcendental vision when we have come to deal particularly

with transcendental knowledge. Worldly knowledge is knowledge in which the reality of the world as well as the reality of the perception of the world are both cognised as true. It is the knowledge of the ignorant masses and dualistic philosophers. Super-worldly knowledge is knowledge in which the reality of the world is not cognised but the reality of the perception of the world is cognised as true. It is the knowledge of those who are a good deal advanced in the path of spirituality. They feel that the world is unsubstantial as it appears to their sight, but they cannot give denial to their perception of it. This means that they are not as yet thoroughly reconciled with the truth of the absolute non-birth of the world. Their minds still hover about the characteristic marks of individuality and generality by which, they think, things produce effects on their perception. Although they have to a large extent quieted the mental tribulations which are inseparable from the perception of duality as absolutely true, they have not yet attained that perfect peace which nothing but a thorough realisation of non-birth can bring. So the Buddha says, "With them there is something effect-producing, and in this attainment of perfect tranquilisation, there is a trace (of dualism) of grasped and grasping. Therefore, they do not attain perfect tranquilisation in every minute of their mental lives.........They cannot attain to (the clear conviction of) an undifferentiated state of all things and the cessation of (all) multiplicities" (*Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, LXXX).

Transcendental knowledge is knowedge in which neither the reality of the world nor the reality of the perception of the world is cognised as true. It is the thorough realisation of the thorough non-birth of the world and an absolute denial to the discrimination of subject and object. Here there is attainment of perfect peace without the least shade of mental perturbation. "The Bodhisattva-

Mahasattvas," says the Buddha, "giving up the view of self-nature as subsisting in all things, attain perfect tranquilisation in every minute of their mental lives" (*L. Sūtra* LXXX). Transcendental knowledge, which is knowledge of the *Paramārtha* svabhāva of all things, alone deserves the name of knowledge or Jñāna, worldly and super-worldly knowledge which is knowledge of the *Parikalpita* and *Paratantra* svabhāvas being truly but another name of want of knowledge.

This division of knowledge as well as the division into three svabhāvas was made by the Buddha.

In consequence of transcendental knowledge Dharmadhātu is known which alone has been called the jñeya because nothing else deserves this name. The knowables of the other two forms of knowledge have been called vijñeya or objects of vijñāna, i.e. particularising knowledge, with which the earth-bound jīva is mainly concerned. The Dharmadhātu is not a knowable in the ordinary sense of the term, and transcendental knowledge also is not knowledge in the ordinary sense, for the latter is unattainable, as will be explained in the last verse and the former is revealed when it is revealed. The jñeya also is indirectly a vijñeya, otherwise how could such a jīva be taught to have any idea of it?

Adored be the Buddha from whom we have learnt about all these, namely, jñāna, jñeya and vijñeya.

ज्ञाने च त्रिविधे ज्ञेये* क्रमेण विदिते स्वयम् ।
सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह महाधियः ॥८९॥

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* A better reading will be ज्ञाने त्रिविधे च ज्ञेये. Śankara has taken त्रिविधे with ज्ञेये instead of with ज्ञाने and hence the above reading although this reading does not at all preclude त्रिविधे from being taken with ज्ञाने ।

Translation—(89) When jñāna in its three aspects and the jñeya (Dharmadhātu, the ultimate reality) itself are known in succession, universal omniscience certainly comes to the high-minded person.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXXIII—"The five Dharmas are name, form, discrimination, right knowledge and suchness (Tathata). (When these are thoroughly comprehended) by the Yogins, they enter into the course of Tathagata's inner realisation, where they are kept away from such views as eternalism and nihilism, realism and negativism, and where they are face to face with the abode of happiness belonging to the present existence as well as to the samapatti† (tranquilisation)."

Exposition:—

(89) When by a thorough examination and understanding of worldly and super-worldly knowledge a person has attained transcendental knowledge and thereby realised Dharmadhātu itself, then that person of high understanding has known everything. He is omniscient, as has been said before, for to him the Paratantra and the Parikalpita world has become suchness (Sagathakam 529).

(b) Vijñeya is of four kinds, of which three are perceptible and one, jñeya, is beyond perception.

हेयज्ञेयाप्यपाक्यानि विज्ञेयान्यग्रयानतः ।
तेषामन्यत्र हि ज्ञेया*दुपलम्भस्त्रिषु स्मृतः ॥९०॥

Translation—(90) According to the Agrayāna (the Advanced Vehicle, the Mahāyāna) the vijñeyas (objects of

† "Samāpatti" should rather be translated as equability, while tranquilisation should stand for Śamāpatti. Sama has the sense of sameness while śama that of tranquility.

*अन्यत्र हि ज्ञेयात् is a better reading than अन्यत्र विज्ञेयात् for the ultimate reality is everywhere called jñeya, in these verses. No difference of meaning is caused by the difference of reading.

vijnāna) are the heyas (what one wants to get rid of, viz, birth, disease, death and so forth), the ineya (the ultimate reality, Dharmadhātu), the āpyas (what one wants to acquire, that is, worldly objects of enjoyment) and the pākyas (what one wants to subdue, that is, greed, anger and folly). Of these, barring the jñeya, perception is known to obtain in the case of the other three.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXIII—"The Blessed One said: What is meant by a worldly object of enjoyment, Mahamati? It means that which can be touched, attracted by, wiped off handled and tasted: it is that which makes one get attached to an external world, enter into a dualism on account of a wrong view, and appear again in the Skandhas, where, owing to the procreative force of desire, there arise all kinds of disaster such as birth, age, disease, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair and so forth."

Ibid, LXVIII—"Further, Mahamati, there are three attachments deep-seated in the minds of the ignorant and simple-minded. They are greed, anger and folly; and thus there is desire which is procreative and is accompanied by joy and greed; closely attached to this there takes place a succession of births in the (five) paths .... When one is cut off from this attachment, no signs will be seen indicative of attachment or non-attachment."

Exposition:—

(90) Before dealing with vijñeyas we should return to verses 45, 47 and 48 where it has been said that when vijñāna which is naturally and eternally non-dual, imageless and calm is set in motion by attachment (verse 55), (it appears as subject and object, the defiled vijñāna which) perceives the world and the world which it perceives vijñāna itself is the ultimate reality while the defiled vijñāna which is its image is the worldly ego before whom appears the

world of multiplicities. The jñeya Dharmadhātu also is, as we have seen above, indirectly an object of its perception. Hence the defiled vijñāna has within its range of perception directly the world and indirectly the jñeya which transcends the world. Being a false light, the false world is directly the object of its perception, but being at the same time a light it can have a remote idea of the true light, otherwise there would be no emancipation for it and the teachings of the Buddhas would be useless. About the defiled vijñāna, in contradistinction with pure jñāna, the Buddha said, "Vijnana is subject to birth and destruction and Jnana is not subject to birth and destruction. Further, Mahamati, vijnana falls into (the dualism of) form and no-form, being and non-being, and is characterised with multiplicity: but Jnana is marked with the transcendence of (the dualism of) form and no-form. Further, Mahamati, vijnana is characterised with accumulation and Jnana with non-accumulation.......Further, Mahamati, Jnana is devoid of attachment; vijnana attaches itself to the multitudinousness of objects. Again, vijnana is produced from the concordance of triple combination; Jnana, in its self-nature, has nothing to do with combination or concordance" (*L. Sūtra*, LXVI). Therefore Gauḍapāda says that according to the Agrayāna, the Advanced Vehicle, which is another name for the Mahāyāna, the Great Vehicle, there are four kinds of vijñānas or objects of vijñāna, comprising everything that comes within the purview of human intelligence. They are, firstly, the *heyas* or whatever a man wants to be free from, birth, disease, death, grief and so forth; secondly, the *jñeya*, the ultimate reality of perfect peace; thirdly, the *āpyas* or the objects of worldly enjoyment which he runs after to acquire; and, fourthly, the *pākyas* or the evils of greed, anger and folly which he wants to subdue because he feels that they destroy his happiness. Of these, the *heyas*, *āpyas* and *pākyas* are objects

of his direct perception. The *jñeya* is, by virtue of its very nature, beyond the scope of the defiled vijñāna's direct perception—it is the soul of the defiled vijñāna which can be sublimed into its essence, but can never realise it as an object existing separately from it. (For the Buddha's sayings about the *heyas*, *āpyas* and *pākyas* see quotations below the translation of this verse.)

Here ends the proof of the proposition enunciated at the beginning. In the conclusion which follows the proposition is re-stated with amplifications in accordance with the facts which have come out in the course of the Proof.

Conclusion

(c) *Jñeya* G. *Paramārtha Āryyajñāna Mahāśūnyatā* —Emptiness in its highest sense of ultimate reality realisable by noble wisdom (the great void of noble wisdom which is the highest reality.)

प्रकृत्याकाशवज्ज्ञेयाः सर्वे धर्मा अनादयः।
विद्यते न हि नानात्वं तेषां क्वचन किञ्चन ॥९१॥

Translation—(91) All the Dharmas, which are beginningless (that is, unborn), are, in their nature, like unto space, (aspects of) the jñeya. No multiplicity exists in them anywhere in the least.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra XXVII—"Again, Mahamati, what is meant by the emptiness in its highest sense of ultimate reality realisable by noble wisdom? It is that in the attainment of an inner realisation by means of noble wisdom there is no trace of habit-energy generated by all the erroneous conceptions (of beginningless past). Thus one speaks of the highest emptiness of ultimate reality realisable by noble wisdom."

Awakening of Faith. pp. 58-59—"There is a two-fold aspect in Suchness if viewed from the point of its explicability. The first is trueness as negative (śunyatā), in the

sense that it is completely set apart from the attributes of all things unreal, that it is the real reality. The second is trueness as affirmative (aśūnyatā), in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent."

Awakening of Faith, pp. 53-54—"The quintessence of the Mahayana as Bhutatathata (Suchness) exists in all things, remains unchanged in the pure as well as in the defiled, is always one and the same (samata), and is void of distinction."

*Ibid.p.*126—"All things are in their nature the highest reality."

Ibid. p. 56—"All things, on account of our confused smriti (subjectivity), appear under the forms of individuation. If we could overcome our confused smriti, the signs of individuation would disappear, and there would be no trace of a world of (individual and isolated) objects."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. LV—"To the Yogins there is one reality which reveals itself as multiplicity, and yet there is no multiplicity in it."

Ibid, Sagathakam 201—"When there is false imagination there is multitudinousness of objects, which is discriminated under the aspect of relativity."

Ibid, Sagathakam 100—"Mind is by nature pure, memory (smriti, habit-energy) has no existence in (Mind which is like) the sky."

Conclusion

Exposition:—

(91) The points which the proof has mainly established are:—(1) The birth of the world cannot be explained by either emanation or causation. Therefore, the world is unborn. (2) The apparent existence of worldly things is relative and false, for they are mutually dependent. (3) The subject or perceiver who perceives the world is himself

false for the same reason. (4) The ultimate reality is never born either as the subject or as the object. (5) The characteristic marks of subject and object are false. (6) The world of subject and object is like an inscrutable image. The ultimate reality is imageless. (7) The world as it is perceived is neither eternal nor nihil. (8) Attachment is the cause of the appearance of the world-image, that is, the Māyā-like presentation of the world. (9) The world is what is seen of the Reality itself through the veil of attachment——the term Āvaraṇa is to be understood in this sense. (10) This attachment also is non-existent as it depends on the world which is non-existent. (11) Thus one attains right knowledge, while the knowledge which knows the world of multiplicity is false knowledge. (12) Right knowledge consists in knowing the world as an unborn vision and knowing also the Ultimate Reality which is viewed as the world. (13) This Ultimate Reality is called vijñāna or Citta as it is the Light, and Dharmadhātu or Tathatā (Bhūtatathatā) as it is the existence which appears as the false existence of the world. (14) Eternal enlightenment is its character. It is knowledge itself as it is the Light. (15) No question of existence or non-existence in the worldly sense arises about it. For, it is existence itself and Light itself apart from any touch of objectivity or subjectivity. (16) Knowing it one knows all, for it is all, and thus one attains perfect peace. (17) It is known when by the realisation of the absolute non-birth of the world, the veil of attachment is removed and its self-light is revealed as transcendental knowledge.

By the establishment of these points the proposition is proved beyond all doubt that all the Dharmas—Form, Name, Discrimination, Suchness and Perfect knowledge—are in their true nature, nothing but the universal Dharmadhātu, the jñeya, and eternal and tranquil and homogeneous like unto space; so that there is absolutely no multi-

plicity in them. The Buddha says, "To the Yogins there is one reality which reveals itself as multiplicity and yet there is no multiplicity in it." (*L. Sūtra*, LV).

Thus is established *Paramārtha* Āryyajñāna Mahāśūnyatā——Emptiness in its highest sense of ultimate reality realisable by noble wisdom or the great void of noble wisdom which is the highest reality. It is called Mahāśūnyatā because there is a twofold aspect in it, namely, the aspect of Śūnyatā or emptiness and the aspect of self-existence.

आदिबुद्धाः प्रकृत्यैव सर्वे धर्माः सुनिश्चिताः।
यस्यैवं भवति क्षान्तिः सोऽमृतत्वाय कल्पते ॥९२॥

Translation—(92) (As aspects of the jñeya) all the Dharmas are, in their very nature, enlightened ones from the beginning and certainties. He who attains (Jñāna) kṣānti (that is, rest or fulfilment or perfection of knowledge) in this way is destined for immortality.

Awakening of Faith pp. 61-62—"Enlightenment is the highest quality of the Mind.....as it is free from all (limiting) attributes of smriti, it is like unto space (akasa), penetrating everywhere, as the unity of all (Dharmadhatu)"

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXXIX—"These Tathagatas are abiding in the joy of existence as it is, as they reached the truth of intuitive knowledge by means of Jnanakshanti."

Ibid, *LXXVII*—"No-birth and no annihilation, this I call Nirvana. By Nirvana, Mahamati, is meant the looking into the abode of reality as it really is in itself; and when along with the turning back of the entire system of mentation (cittacaitta—kalapa), there is the attainment of self-realisation by means of noble wisdom, which belongs to the Tathagatas, I call it Nirvana."

Exposition:—

(92) Being, in their true nature, the jñeya all the Dharmas are eternally enlightened and one with the Reality. By attaining this perfection of knowledge one becomes immortal, for birth and death have no longer any meaning for such a wise man. In the *Laṅkāvatāra* the Buddha actually uses the term *kṣānti* to indicate perfection of knowledge.

आदिशान्ता ह्यनुत्पन्नाः प्रकृत्यैव सुनिर्वृताः ।
सर्वे धर्माः समाभिन्ना अजं साम्यं विशारदम् ॥९३ ॥

Translation—(93) cf. 80. All the Dharmas, are in their very nature, quiescent from the beginning, unborn, blissful, the same (*sama* equable), undifferentiated. (This) unborn *sāmya* (sameness) is infinite (universal, boundless).

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, *LXXXV*—"When all things, external or internal, are examined with intelligence, Mahamati, knowing and known are found to be quiescent. But when it is not recognised that all things rise from the discrimination of the Mind itself, discrimination asserts itself. When this is understood, discrimination ceases."

Ibid, *XXXIII*—"The highest reality is an exalted state of bliss."

Ibid, *Sagathakam* 417—"The two-fold egolessness the Citta, Manas and Manovijnana, the five Dharmas, the (three) Svabhavas—they do not belong to my essence."

Awakening of Faith. pp. 56-57—"Therefore all things in their fundamental nature are not namable or explicable. They cannot be expressed in any form of language. They are without the range of apperception. (They are universals). They (things in their fundamental nature) have no signs of distinction. (They are not particulars). They possess absolute samata (sameness). (They are universals.) They are subject neither to transformation nor to destruc-

tion. They are nothing but the one soul (atma), for which Bhutatathata (Suchness) is another designation."

Lankāvatāra Sūtra LXXXIX—"There is an eternally abiding reality (which is to be understood) according to the hidden meaning because it is something that has neither antecedents nor consequents."

Exposition:—

(93) Thus all the Dharmas are, in their true nature, eternally quiescent (see verse 86), unborn, blissful, the same (sama) and undifferentiated, and this unborn or eternal sameness is universal or infinite. It is not that they were different before and have attained this sameness subsequently by any process, but they are eternally the same.

The highest reality is thus Light, Existence and Bliss.

वैशारद्यन्तु वै नास्ति भेदे विचरतां सदा।
भेदनिम्नाः पृथग्बाला*स्तस्मात्ते कृपणाः स्मृताः ॥९४॥
अजे साम्ये तु ये केचिद्भविष्यन्ति सुनिश्चिताः।
ते हि लोके महाज्ञानास्तच्च लोको न गाहते ॥९५॥

Translation—(94) Infinitude, however, does not exist for those who always move in the midst of distinction. The ignorant and simple-minded are inclined to making distinctions and are, therefore, considered poor.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, XXIV—"The ignorant, owing to their erroneous discrimination, imagine here the multiplicity of phenomena; the wise, however, do not."

Translation—(95) They forsooth are the great men possessed of jñāna in the world who, however, are well

* "पृथक्बालाः" is most probably the correct reading here and not पृथक्वादाः, for it is the term which corresponds to the term बालपृथक्जनाः by which the ***Lankāvatāra Sūtra*** everywhere designates the ignorant masses. Moreover भेदनिम्नाः and पृथक्वादाः would make a tautology.

established in the unborn *sāmya*. But the world does not comprehend it.

Awakening of Faith. p. 80—"The significance of the Doctrine is so extremely deep and unfathomable that it can be fully comprehended by Buddhas and no others."

XIV—Transcendental Jñāna of the Buddha

अजेष्वजमसंक्रान्तं धर्मेषु ज्ञानमिष्यते ।
यतो न क्रमते ज्ञानमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥९६॥

Translation—(96) (This) jñāna in the unborn Dharmas is considered to be unborn and unattained. As jñāna is not attainable, it is declared touchless.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra LXVI—"Again, Mahamati, Jnana is characterised with unattainability; it is the inner state of self-realisation by noble wisdom, and as it neither enters nor goes out, it is like the moon in water."

Ibid, LXXXII—"With the Tathagatas it is an intuitive experience as if it were an Amalaka fruit held in the palm of the hand."

Ibid, LXVI—"Mahamati, Jnana is devoid of attachment."

Awakening of Faith. pp. 74-75—"Buddha teaches that all beings are from all eternity ever-abiding in Nirvana. In truth, enlightenment cannot be manufactured, nor can it be created; it is absolutely intangible; it is no material existence that is an object of sensation.....Wisdom itself has nothing to do with material phenomena whose characteristic feature is extension in space, and there are no attributes there by which wisdom can become tangible. This is the meaning of Buddha's brief statement just referred to."

Exposition:—

(94-96) But ignorant and simple-minded people are always given to making distinctions between the Dhar-

mas. Their knowledge being thus poor, they become subject to birth, death and all sorts of sufferings. The bliss of Nirvana belongs only to those who are firmly established in the highest knowledge, the knowledge of the unborn sameness of all the Dharmas which is so difficult to comprehend that Aśvaghoṣa has said, "It can be comprehended by Buddhas and by no others" (*Awakening of Faith*, p. 80).

Perfect knowledge

Now the question naturally arises, is the unborn sameness,which is the Dharmadhātu, something to which one's knowledge is extended, or, putting it in another way, does one attain or acquire the knowledge by which he knows the unborn sameness? The reply is, no. It is transcendental jñāna in which there is neither object nor perception, and so it neither extends to anything nor is acquired. When the non-birth of the Dharmas is understood by a thorough examination of their character, it is revealed in them as the self-light of the Dharmadhātu to which they are reduced. It is the unborn and unattained light in the unborn dharmas. It belongs to the nature of Dharmadhātu and is one with it, and so as the Dharmadhātu is unattainable and touchless it is also unattainable and touchless. There is not the least trace of the duality of perception and perceived in it. Aśvaghoṣa says, "Enlightenment is the highest quality of the Mind; it is free from all the (limiting) attributes of Smriti. As it is free from all the (limiting) attributes of smriti, it is like unto spaee (akasa) penetrating everywhere as the unity of all (Dharmadhatu). That is to say, it is the universal Dharmakaya of all Tathagatas". (*Awakening of Faith*, pp. 61-62). Thus Aśvaghośa calls it a quality of the Mind and identifies it with Dharmadhātu. In fact, the highest reality, when it is conceived of as the existence which is the essence of all the Dharmas, is called Dharmadhātu, and, when it is conceived of as the light

of which the false light of the worldly ego is but an image, it is called Citta (Mind) or vijñāna having jñāna as its highest characteristic. All this has been explained before.

It is Pariniṣpanna Svabhāva in which Right knowledge and Suchness are both included. "Right knowledge and Suchness," said the Buddha, "are indestructible, and thus they are known as Parinishpanna" (*L. Sūtra*, LXXXIII And again , "Form, name and discrimination (correspond to) the two forms of svabhava, and Right knowledge and Suchness to the Parinishpanna aspect" (*L. Sūtra*, XXIII).

The root *Kram* has the sense of growth or development in the Ātmanepada and of going, reaching, extending or attacking in the Parasmaipada. Here the Ātmanepada is used and so *asaṃkrānta* means unattained, that is, unacquired, not the result of growth, although the sense of going or reaching is also conveyed. In translating *na kramate* into "is not attainable," both the senses are retained, for knowledge reaches a thing by development and is called acquired. The point is that like the jñeya, jñāna is infinite and tranquil like unto the sky (see verse 1.) and so the idea of growth or motion does not obtain in relation to it.

अणुमात्रेऽपि वैधर्म्ये जायमाने विपश्चितः ।
असंगता सदा नास्ति किमुतावरणच्युतिः ॥९७ ॥

Translation—(97) When even the least deviation from this character takes place (in the jñāna) of an unwise person, there is always an absence of touchlessness. How then can there be the falling off of the Āvaraṇas (hindrances) which obscure the Dharmadhātu ?

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra LXXXIX—"Knowledge-hindrance, Mahamati, is purified when the egolessness of things is distinctly perceived; but passion-hindrance is destroyed when first the egolessness of persons is perceived and acted upon, for (then) the Manovijnana ceases to function.

Further, Dharma-hindrance is given up because of the disappearance of the habit-energy (accumulated) in the Alayavijnana, which is now thoroughly purified."

Exposition:—

(97) The least deviation from this standard of absolute touchlessness of jñāna marks a man as ignorant. And as he has not got touchless jñāna, the veil of knowledge hindrance and passion-hindrance (jñeyāvaraṇa and kleśāvaraṇa) operating, as we have seen before, in the form of the dualistic ideas of existence and non-existence, is not removed. Consequently he does not realise his identity with the absolute reality of Dharmadhātu. And the emptiness or egolessness of persons and things being thus not realised, he is unenlightened and bound to the wheel of birth and death.

अलब्धावरणाः सर्वे धर्माः प्रकृतिनिर्मलाः ।
आदौ बुद्धास्तथा मुक्ता बुद्ध्यन्त इति नायकाः ॥९८॥

Translation—(98) The Dharmas all had never any *Āvaraṇa*, are spotless in their nature, enlightened and so emancipated from the beginning. So do the Masters understand.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. LXVIII—"Further, Mahamati, when the existence and non-existence of the external world are understood to be due to the seeing of the Mind itself in these signs, (the Bodhisattva) can enter upon the state of imagelessness where Mind only is, and (there) see into the solitude which characterises the discrimination of all things as being and non-being and the deep-seated attachments resulting therefrom. This being so, there are in all things no signs of a deep-rooted attachment or of a detachment. Here, Mahamati, is nobody in bondage, nobody in emancipation, except those who by reason of their perverted wisdom recognise bondage and emancipation."

Exposition:—

(98) Wise men, however, in whom touchless jñāna has been revealed in all its purity and who have thus seen the emptiness of persons and things, realise that all the Dharmas being, in their nature, nothing but the Dharmadhātu, are, by nature, pure, without having ever been really veiled by any hindrance, and eternally enlightened and liberated. The fact is that all the Dharmas being always unborn and the same, the hindrances are false. Realising this through the revelation of true inner light, one is emancipated.

क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः ॥
सर्वे धर्मोस्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् ॥९९॥

Translation—(99) Hence the fully-enlightened Buddha's jñāna in the Dharmas is not attainable. Similarly, the Dharmas all do not attain jñāna. (That is, transcendental jñāna is unborn and touchless and so does not depend on anybody or anything for its existence. It is not like the worldly or super-worldly jñāna which is relative and exists only in association with the knower and the known. It is knowledge absolute.) This has been said by the Buddha.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. *LXXI*—"When (we know that) there is knowledge gained independent of any supporting object, whatever statements we make about it are no more than thought-constructions. That (transcendental) knowledge is unobtainable is due to the recognition that there is nothing in the world but what is seen of the Mind, and that these external objects to which being and non-being are predicated are non-existent. As this (knowledge) is unobtainable, there is no evolving of knowing and known, and as thus the triple emancipation is realised, there is unattainable knowledge (which is transcendental)."

Ibid. *LXVI*—"The Tathagata's Prajna is spotless (amalā) because of its being in accordance with Mind only".

Exposition:—

(99) This jñāna of a Buddha or wise man who is fully enlightened in the Dharmas is not attainable but is one with his nature. Similarly, it is one with the nature of all the Dharmas and is not such as is attained by them. It was the Buddha Gautama who taught this.

दुर्दर्शमतिगम्भीरमजं साम्यं विशारदम् ।
बुद्ध्वा पदमनानात्वं नमस्कुर्मो यथाबलम् ॥१००॥

Translation—(100) Having understood the state of non-multiplicity, the sāmya which is hard to see, very deep, unborn (and) infinite, we make obeisance according to our capacity.

Thus is proved the proposition enunciated in the first five verses.

Exposition:—

Thus is proved the Proposition which had to be proved and Gauḍapāda finishes the treatise by paying proper obeisance to the Buddha by whose grace he has been enlightened in the principle of unborn and infinite sameness, the essential calmness of the fire-brand.

HINDU LAW, A CODE OF DUTIES

By K. R. R. SASTRY

THE Jurisprudence that has been covered in the Hindu Codes (*Smṛtis*) appears complete and exhaustive and includes all branches of law suitable to "the exigencies of Hindu Society and actually prevalent therein."[1]

If Sir Henry Maine found a singular dearth of rules of land tenure it is due to the fact that the peasant was the proprietor of the land under his cultivation. The sovereign got *tax*, not rent from the subject.

The Hindu system of Law was suited to the needs of the people whose social relations it had to adjust and regulate.

At the threshold one finds the term "Hindu" itself exotic in origin, having come in probably since Persia came into contact with India. The inhabitants originally styled themselves as belonging to "Jambūdwīpa" or "*Bhārata-khaṇḍa*", two words still being repeated in the *Saṅkalpa* prior to bath in holy waters.

The Hindu law is *a code of duties*. In a community like that of the ancient Hindus saturated with religion and philosophy, it is not surprising that their ancient scriptures—*Śrutis* and later *Smṛtis*—should be almost replete with one's *duties* rather than rights. This does not mean that as distinguished from *Right*, ancient Hindu Society was unfamiliar with *specific rights* as e.g. father's rights over the son's person and property, husband's rights over his wife's person and property, girl's rights to choose her husband, proprietory rights, son's rights to hold sepa-

[1] A chapter from a forthcoming work on "*Hindu Jurisprudence.*"
[2] G. C. Sarkar Sastry. *Hindu Law.* VIII, Ed. p. 57.

rate property, and wife's rights to her *Strīdhana*. In the west, the start from individual rights has led to clashes and conflicts of interests tending to the disintegration of family harmony and fanning a number of antagonisms in society by multiplying group conflicts, functional antipathies, and resulting disharmonies.

The purpose of law, according to a great Austinian, Dr. Holland, is the creation and protection of legal rights. The ancient Hindu started with a complete grasp of the destiny of the individual where his spiritual and temporal interests were inextricably interwoven from the moment of conception through the sixty-four *Sanskāras* beyond the death of his mortal coil.

Thus from the earliest hymns of the *Ṛgveda* a Hindu's (Dharma) is spoken of under several circumstances. One of those words defying exact rendering, is derived from धृ (dhṛ) meaning "to uphold, to support, to nourish."

Mm. P. V. Kane[3] has found this word occurring fifty-six times in the *Ṛgveda*. It has passed through several vicissitudes. The term has stood for "religious rites", "fixed principles or rules of conduct" and the "whole body of religious duties."

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (2-23) a significant passage refers to three branches of Dharma :—

(i) Sacrifice, study of the vedas, almsgiving—that is the first.

(ii) Austerity indeed is the second.

(iii) A student of sacred knowledge (*Brahmacārin*) dwelling in the house of a teacher, settling himself permanently in the house of a teacher is the third.

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[3] Now Vice-Chancellor of the Bombay University, in the *History of Dharmaśāstra* Vol. I, pp. 1 to 4.

All these become possessors of meritorious worlds. He who stands firm in *Brahman* "attains immortality."

In the passage extracted, advertence is to the *Āśrama* duties.

The thrilling exhortation in the *Taittīrya Upaniṣad*, सत्यं वद, धर्मं चर (I,II) (speak the truth, practise (your own *dharma*) as also the reference in the *Bhagawadgītā* (Song Celestial) have the same meaning.

When one passes to the Smṛtis[4] the same sense is continued. Medhātithi commenting on Manu says that the Smṛtis dilate on *Dharma* as five-fold e.g. *Varṇa-dharma*, *Āśrama-dharma*, *Varṇāśrama-dharma*, *naimittika-dharma* (e.g. *Prāyaścitta*) and *guṇa-dharma* (the duty of a kirg to protect).

Dharma thus includes religious, moral, social and legal duties, and can only be defined by its contents.

An examination of the four sources of sacred law as mentioned by Manu[5] the Veda, the Smṛti, customs of the virtuous, and one's own conscience,

वेदः स्मृतिः सदाचारः स्वस्य च प्रियमात्मनः ।
एतच्चतुर्विधं प्राहुः साक्षाद्धर्मस्य लक्षणम् ।।

The admixture of law, religion, and morality is complete.

Ṛita in Vedic hymns

In the Vedic texts, the word *Ṛita* (ऋत) or *Vrata* (व्रत) is used to denote physical laws[6] or the uniformity of nature or the organized principle of the universe, comparable to the *Lex Aeterna* of the later Romans.[7] [Dr. Berolzheimar derives '*ratum*', '*ratio*' from ऋतं.]

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4 *Maneur*. (I. 2) ! *Yājñavalkya* (I; 1).

5 *Maneur*. II ; 12 ; *Yāj*. I, 7, also.

6 *Ṛgveda*. I, 105, 12. II, 5, 4. IX, 73, 6. I, 24, 10. II, 13, 7. IX, 73, 8. I, 25, 8. VI, 39, 4. IX, 86, 28, 29, I, 73, 6. VII, 71, 3. X, 138, 2. I, 136, 2. VIII, 86, 11.

7 Vide. Modern Legal Philosophy—II, p. 97.

One hymn from the *Ṛgveda* (Book *X*, Hymn 190, verse (1) may here be expected—

"From fervour kindled to its height eternal law and truth were born:

Thence both the day and night and thence the billowy flood of sea arose."[8]

Passages from the Vedas may be culled where the word *Rta* or *Vrata* stands for the instincts of animals.[9]

Ṛta or *Vrata* is also used to express the rules of sacrifice.[10]

One typical hymn runs as follows—

"Lauded by Jamadagni's song, sit in the place of holy law

Drink Soma, ye, who strengthen law"

(*R.V.* III, 62, 18)

Ṛta has been used in the sense of sacrificial altar and identified with the sacrifice also.[11]

Dharma is figuratively described as the *path-way*:—

मानः पथः पित्र्यान्मानवादधिदूरं नैष्टपरावतः

"Lead us not from our father's and from Manu's path into the distance far away"

(*R.V.* VIII.30,3)[12]

Dharma is found compared to the divine bull[13]. This is later repeated in *Manusmṛti* (VIII, 16) and *Nārada Smṛti*.

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[8] *Griffith*, Vol. IV, p. 415.

[9] *Ṛgveda*. IX, 100, 7. X, 20, 2.

[10] R. *V*. I, 36. 19, R. V. III, 62, 18, I, 54, 7. III, 62, 13. I, 77, 2. IV, 56, 6. I, 90, 61. V, 12, 2. II, 23, 17. VII, 66, 19. VIII, 12, 15. VIII, 23, 9.

[11] R. *V*. I, 43, 9. I, 84, 4. V, 21, 4.

[12] Also R. V. X, 14, 5. X. 100, 12. X, 133, 6. Also *Sāma Veda*. Part II. B. K. VII, Ch. III, hymn 2, Vetse 3.

[13] R. *V*. VI, 1, 1.

Though '*Ṛtam*' has been used in a variety of senses in the Vedas, the following special references suggest "rules of human conduct generally without any reference to sacrificial rites".

"Law strengthens those who keep the Law." *Sāmaveda*. Part II. Bk. II Ch. 2 Hymn 6, Verse 2.

"They true to law exceeding strong, have set them down for sovereign rule. Princes whose laws stand fast have obtained their sway."

Ṛgveda VIII, 25, 8.

Vedic basis of Hindu Jurisprudence

Mm. P. V. Kane has brought together about fifty Vedic passages that shed light on marriage, the forms of marriage, the different kinds of sons, adoption of a son, partition, inheritance, *Śrāddha*, and *Strī-dhana*[14]. It is true that the Vedas do not contain *Vidhis* (positive precepts) on matters of *Dharma* in a connected form. It can nonetheless be substantiated that the later rules contained in the *Dharmaśāstras* had their unmistakable roots "deep down in the most ancient Vedic tradition." The authors of the Dharmaśāstras were quite justified "in looking up to the Vedas as a source of Dharma[15]."

Basic Postulate

It is to this day a basic postulate among the followers of Hindu tradition that "not only all law and usage but all knowledge is enshrined in the Veda[16]."

वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलं (*Manu*., II,6)

Prof. K. V. Rangaswamy Iyengar draws three logical conclusions from this basic assumption:—

(a) That there should be internal consistency in law.

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[14] J. B. B. R. A. S. XXVI, 57—82.

[15] P. V. Kane. *H. D. S.* Vol. I. p. 7.

[16] K. V. Rangaswamy. *Raja Dharma*. 1941, p 80.

(b) The differences which appear are resolvable by enquiry; and

(c) for every rule of law a Vedic basis can be discovered.

The Veda is eternal, omniscient, and infallible, and the Vedas have no limit (अनन्ता वै वेदाः).

The Mīmāṁsā School held[17] that the Vedas entirely and exclusively concern themselves with *Dharma*. *Dharma* has been defined by Jaimini in his second aphorism—

चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्म्मः (Jaimini I, i, 2)

as that "which is signified by a direction and leads to a benefit."

When one is unable to find Vedic authority for a rule Jaimini would assume that the *Śruti* had passed out of view or is hidden and the *Śruti* text will come to view if diligently searched for.[18]

Medhātithi (9th century A.D.) and *Viśwarūpa*[19] (beginning of 9th century A.D.) particularly have strenuously established the Vedic origin of the Smṛtis.

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17 Its founder Jaimini is assigned to the 5th century B. C. by a great Mīmāṁsā Scholar Sir Ganganatha Jha. He certainly lived prior to 650-A. D.

18 *Raja Dharma*, K. V. Rangaswamy, p. 80.

19 Identified with Sureśwarācārya, a pupil of Ādyaguru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

CATALOGUE OF THE ANUP SANSKRIT LIBRARY.—Prepared by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja and Shri K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M. O. L. Fasciculus V. Bikaner, pp. 401-500, 1948.

The present Fasciculus of the Catalogue contains a list of 1344 manuscripts preserved in the *Anup Sanskrit Library* of Bikaner. The manuscripts belong to Jyotisha, Kośa, Chandas, Vyākaraṇa, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Advaita, Dvaita and Śaiva. The catalogue, no doubt is a work of great labour and patience, but its importance can never be exaggerated. So it is expected that at least some information regarding the contents and some references in the text will be given. Mere mention of the names of the Mss and the authors leave us in great anxiety as to the real nature of the Mss. Then I find in this book under Vyākaraṇa a Ms named '*Nyāyasūtra*' on page 428. This is for the first time that I have come across such a name under Vyākaraṇa. Either it is by mere mistake that such a Ms has been included under this head, or if it is a genuine name of a book on Vyākaraṇa, then it was necessary for the editor to add a short note regarding the nature of the book and also a note on the peculiar title of a Vyākaraṇa work. It is very interesting and perhaps a great discovery to find out a book called *Nyāyasūtra* belonging to Vyākaraṇa. However, it is very encouraging to find the Curator so enthusiastic in his duty. I welcome this addition to our literature.

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SAṄKALPASŪRYODAYA of Shri Venkaṭanātha with two commentaries Prabhāvilāsa and Prabhāvalī. Published in the Adyar Library Series in two parts, pp. xxxii and 938, 1948 Price Rs. 15/- per volume.

That the Adyar Library is doing very great service to enhance the cause of Sanskrit learning in so many ways is well known to all. It has published several valuable works with critical notes from time to time. The present work is a well-known drama of Śri Venkaṭanātha. Indian life is a life of Philosophy. Life is the practical aspect of philosophy in India and it is because of this that Philosophy is so very popular here. Scholars have tried to interpret philosophical truths in various ways. Writing of drama is one of the modes of presenting to people at large the highest aim of life. *Saṅkalpasūryodaya* is an allegorical drama in which the characters of the play are not real persons but abstract human qualities which are personified. It aims mainly to explain the Vedāntic thoughts. We are reminded of *Prabodhacandrodaya* and *Amṛtodaya* of the great Gokulanatha Upadhyaya of Mithila. The play is indeed a very excellent work of the author. It has almost all the beauties of a drama.

It is a fact which needs no explanation that the work has not been so popular. All people do not like to study Vedānta. All are not even qualified to do so. But that does not take away the beauty of the book. The verses are so very charming and the deliniation of the characters are so attractive that one cannot but entertain high praise for the author. The work has been written strictly in accordance with the rules of dramaturgy. But one can also find that the poet has taken sometimes a great liberty to have his own choice as well. It is written in ten acts and it is difficult to stage, but it is easily staged, they say, even in recent times but the South. But one cannot have so much control over himself to maintain his interest in the whole play when staged. The publisher is to be congratulated for encouraging sanskritic studies by publishing such works even these days when people are somewhat reluctant towards such activities.

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH BURMA, (1826—1886) by A. C. Banerji. The National Information and Publications Ltd., Tulloch Road, Apollo Bunder, Bombay. 1947. Pages 48. Price Re 1/-

This booklet on Burmese relations with the British Government in the nineteenth century has been published in the series 'Short Studies in Indian History', planned 'to meet - the needs and demands of the common man' written 'in popular form and language, avoiding altogether technical details and use of references and footnotes'.

The author is a well-kuown scholar, who has to his credit some research on the eastern frontier of India. In the pamphlet, under reference, a general survey of the relations has been given till the annexation of Upper Burma under Lord Dufferin. The First Burmese War has been dealt with briefly while the second in greater details, with a more and undue emphasis on the internal affairs of Burma....which could have been easily left out from sueh a booklet. The last war however, has been narrated vaguely. One regrets to note that the object with which the series was planned by the General Editor, Mr. Jagmohan Mahajan has not been truly achieved through this booklet. The book has failed to provide an interest for the general reader. One of the reasons for such a shortcoming may be said to be the dearth of research on this aspect of modern Indian History.

We, however, commend the National Information and Publications Ltd., for undertaking a series of this kind on every aspect of Indian History, which was a long-felt want of those who are interested in India's past history.

THE MOTHER GODDESS KĀMĀKHYĀ. By Bani Kanta Kakati. Published by Punya Prasad Duara for the Assam Publishing Corporation, Uzanbazar, Ganbati, Assam.—Pages ix + 91. 1948. Price Rs. 3/-.

This is a stimulating volume on the fusion of Aryan and Primitive beliefs of Assam. As the author says in the Preface : "The present Publication is a mere introduction towards the study of the fusion of the Aryan and extra-Aryan religious beliefs and practices in Assam in the light of the comparative method of modern sociological studies. The beliefs and practices have been tracked as far as possible to their sources. No conclusion has been hazarded because none is possible at this stage. An attempt has only been made to enlarge the scope of discussion." The *Kālikā Purāṇa* the *Yoginī Tantra* and the Copperplate land-grants of early Hindu Kings in Assam form the main sources of the present work. The author has given the varied materials a sort of coherence by choosing the figure of Mother Goddess Kāmākhyā as the pivot. Magic, witchcraft and sorcery constitute the popular religion of Assam and they have very aptly been made to revolve round the figure of Mother Kāmākhyā.

The book throws light on various aspects of ancient period of the history of Assam. It is very interesting and informative.
